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Stephen Pacey 
 
 
Abstract for D Prof (PW) 
 
 
This work is based on my experience and the public works I have done as a 
tribunal judge. I explain the function and significance of tribunals in the justice 
system as a whole and their wider purpose in society. I attempt to lift the veil about 
becoming a judge, what influenced me, how I go about judicial decision making 
and its problems.  
 
The motivation for the work arises from the fact that the perspective offered by 
retirement from the full time judiciary presented a good opportunity to reflect 
critically on my judicial work, the backdrop being the public works in the shape of 
my decisions as a Commissioner and Upper Tribunal Judge. 
 
‘Judging the Judge’ encapsulates what this work is about. Evaluating, critically 
reflecting upon and extrapolating useful lessons from my time as a judge. 
‘Boundaries’ are the limits imposed upon me as a judge – what I could properly do, 
how far I could go, the limitations of the law, rules of procedure, formality and the 
ambit of discretion, for example. ‘Barriers’ are in the form of obstructions to 
justice (or, at a more prosaic level, implementation of the law) such as lack of 
representation, the complexity, volume and rapidity of change in the law and 
problems arising from austerity measures. ‘Benefits’ has a dual meaning: First, the 
benefits of a judicial system in the rule of law, benefits to the individual and the 
wider society. Second, the benefits system itself, the bedrock of my work since 
without such state provision there would be nothing to appeal. 
 
The novelty value of this work is that it offers an honest and unvarnished glimpse 
into the mind of a judge, subject only to the constraints imposed by professional 
circumspection. It tells what it is to be a judge, not just what the judge does. The 
reader will see the day to day pleasures and problems in judging, the thoughts of a 
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judge about contemporary issues, how a judge makes a decision and handles his 
work. In some aspects it foreshadows and illustrates some of the issues dealt with 
in the first ever judicial attitude survey (Thomas 2014). In a sense it shows that I 
have myself become a ‘public work’, being shaped and conditioned by my working 
environment, in every sense of that word. 
 
I address conceptual problems about the nature and effect of justice and if it is 
important. As part of this I also address current societal and political problems and 
their impact on welfare law in general. I place the study also in the context of 
austerity measures and show how efficiency savings could be made. 
 
The methodology is experientially based, from my career in various tribunals and, 
finally, at the highest level of tribunal justice. I provide a critical review derived 
from my professional experience. I draw insights and ideas from my career which 
have been meaningful to me and which I suggest are relevant to the wider legal and 
judicial profession. I offer, then, access to my professional learning.  
 
In part I contrast formal court and informal tribunal procedures, addressing merits 
and drawbacks. I draw upon academic and professional sources in attempting to 
give a balanced overview of tribunals and reflect on these sources and how they 
resonate – or not – with my experience. 
 
As appendices, and indicative of the public works I have done, I attach some of my 
decisions, of various kinds and with differing scenarios and results. 
 
I conclude that tribunals have for a long time been under valued and under 
appreciated, not only in the machinery of justice but also in terms of their wider 
impact. I explain how and why this has come about and what steps ought to be 
taken to improve the system for tribunal users.  
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Introduction 
 
 
I was a Judge of the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber). I decided 
appeals on points of law from decisions of the First – tier Social Entitlement 
Tribunal which, in turn, hears initial appeals from decisions by governmental 
decision makers on claims to a wide range of welfare benefits, such as Disability 
Living Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance. In the 2013 – 2014 
financial year this tribunal received 401,917 cases1, more than any other tribunal.2 
About 1-2% of theses cases go on appeal to the Upper Tribunal 3. The Upper 
Tribunal also has a judicial review function in some cases (see Appendix L for an 
example) and has a UK wide jurisdiction covering 25 appellate and first – instance 
jurisdictions. The social entitlement work comprises 20 non-means tested benefits 
(some of which depend on contributions to the relevant fund and others of which 
are non-contributory), and 6 means-tested benefits. There are c.5,000,000 
claimants on out-of-work benefits and dependent on jobseeker’s allowance and 
other benefits, and millions of people receive state pensions, based on 
contributions, with or without means-tested pension credit. 
 
As the Chamber President says, ‘No slice of the national expenditure exceeds that 
laid out on social security matters, which have a high political profile and often 
involve sensitive matters on which strongly held and contrasting opinions are 
expressed in the media and elsewhere. Also, and although many social security 
cases relate to relatively small sums of money, [see Appendix Q] the effect of one 
decision on many others, especially regarding a major benefit, can result in 
significant expenditure of public money.’ (Charles 2013:14) 
 
The Upper Tribunal is effectively the supervising judicial body for the First – tier 
Tribunal. Appeals before the Upper Tribunal are usually dealt with by a single 
                                                        
1 HM Courts and Tribunals Statistics 2013 – 2014 
2 In the same period Employment Tribunals, for example, received 218,000 cases. 
3 See note 1 
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judge but a panel of three judges may sit if there is a point of law of special 
difficulty or an important point of principle or practice.  
 
The forecasted expenditure on state benefits for 2014-15 is £212.1 billion, 30% of 
all state expenditure. In many respects the Judges of the Upper Tribunal 
(Administrative Appeals Chamber) are gatekeepers for this.  
 
The Upper Tribunal encompasses judges from a previously disparate group. The 
largest number of judges subsumed into the new appellate structure, created in 
2007, were the Social Security Commissioners. I was a Commissioner from 1996 
and from 2007 was a Judge of the Upper Tribunal until retirement in 2013. Before 
1996 I was, for 5 years, a Tribunal Judge at the first instance level. 
 
Most First - tier Tribunal decisions require permission to appeal to the Upper 
Tribunal. This can be given by the First – tier or, if refused, by the Upper Tribunal. 
Only if an arguable error of law is in issue can permission be given. 4 See 
Appendices A and C as examples of permission given in the Upper Tribunal, and 
appendix D for a refusal. 
 
The decisions of the Upper Tribunal, and previously those of the Commissioners, 
are important because they bind the parties in an appeal. There is a right of appeal 
to the Court of Appeal (with permission from the Upper Tribunal or the Court of 
Appeal) but the cost, delay and legal complexity of Court of Appeal proceedings 
means that most appeals do not progress beyond the Upper Tribunal5. Of greater 
importance to the public at large, however, is the fact that Upper Tribunal decisions 
have the force of precedent, so the public (claimants) and the government 
(departmental decision makers, for example) are also bound by the point of law 
decided, and must take it into account in other cases involving the same point at 
issue. Thus, there are different stakeholders in the appeals process. 
 
                                                        
4 Errors of law include: Making perverse or irrational findings on material matters (in practice a 
high hurdle to surmount), failing to give any or adequate reasons for the decision, failing to 
address relevant evidence, attaching weight to immaterial matters, making a material misdirection 
in law or a procedural error. About 60% of applications for permission made to the Upper Tribunal 
are refused. 
5 For example in 2010 of the 1180 appeals filed in the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) only two 
came from the Social Security Commissioners. (Ministry of Justice statistics) 
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Not all cases involve an interpretation of a new point of law. Most involve 
consideration of the adequacy of the tribunal’s decision. Some decisions are 
published in annual reports, others are on the Upper Tribunal web site and the  
majority stored on the Upper Tribunal database. 6  Most decisions are made by 
reference to the bundle of appeal documents but regularly the Upper Tribunal 
conducts oral hearings and, save in cases involving sensitive evidence, those 
hearings are open to the public. 
 
In some courts judgments are given ex tempore i.e. on the spot. This is rare in the 
Upper Tribunal, as that tribunal must provide written reasons7, save when the 
parties consent. Appendix E is an example of the latter. Contrast this with P, a fully 
reasoned and long (but not unusually long) decision.  
 
It is the giving of reasons that often proves problematic. In the 1860s Lord 
Chancellor Hatherley said he rarely delivered a written judgment because he found 
it ‘injurious to his health’. (Pannick1987: 6). No doubt he would have agreed with 
Lord Mansfield:8’Never give your reasons, for although your judgment will almost 
certainly be right your reasons will almost certainly be wrong’. (Pannick  1987: 8). 
 
I hope to achieve the personal satisfaction of meaningful work related study by this 
account of my experience and critical review of it and arrive at an overview of the 
type of work I have undertaken and what this signifies for the public at large. I 
critique not just ‘what is’ but ‘what is possible.’ 
 
I attach some examples of my decisions (anonymised as appropriate). These are 
simply to illustrate some of the issues involved and how they are dealt with, 
ranging from the relatively straightforward (Appendix M) to the complex 
(Appendix N). They are only general, indicative and not paradigm, examples.  
 
Who might be interested in this work? I suggest a diverse audience, of different 
disciplines and stakeholders: First, judges (whether in my jurisdiction, similar 
jurisdictions or in the wider judiciary) may be interested in how I work and how I 
have adapted to changing scenarios. Second, those aspiring to or just considering                                                         
6 Members of the public are entitled to be sent copies of any decision (irrespective of whether they 
were a party to that appeal) on request. Additionally, departmental decision makers retain their 
own database of decisions and use this resource extensively. 
7 Rule 40(3) Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules 
8 Lord Chief Justice, Kings Bench, 1756-1788 
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the judiciary may benefit from an insight into what goes on. Third, tribunal users 
(including civil servants) may be interested to see what a judge does, how he 
operates and addresses problems.9 Fourth there is the wider public, who may wish 
to enquire beyond tabloid headlines about the work of judges and how reality 
might depart significantly from perception. Fifth, law students might benefit from 
or be interested in an account of modern judicial work and challenges, and may 
like to have an insight into what goes on in a judge’s mind. 
 
Judges from time to time write articles, make speeches or give (usually very 
guarded) interviews, but are by nature and training reserved when it comes to any 
public elucidation of who they are and their working lives. Darbyshire in her book 
‘Sitting in Judgment - The Working Lives of Judges’ set out to give ‘…an 
unvarnished glimpse of the modern courtroom which shows a legal system under 
stress, lacking resources but facing an ever – increasing caseload…essential 
reading for anyone wishing to know about the experience of modern judging, the 
education, training and professional lives of judges, and the current state of the 
courts and  judiciary in England and Wales.’ (Darbyshire 2011: Preface).As  the 
(then) Lord Chief Justice (Igor Judge) said in the foreword, however, Dr 
Darbyshire confines herself to the formal courts (from the Supreme Court to 
Magistrates’ Courts), and does not deal with Tribunals. 10 (Darbyshire 2011: 
foreword). The citizen is much more likely to be a tribunal than a court user, 
although it is the latter that most people have in mind when thinking of the 
judiciary. Although (or perhaps because) the tribunal system is the backroom 
Cinderella of the machinery of justice11 it figures largely in the lives of many and 
has the potential to affect all by its decisions. It is, thus, worthy of consideration. 
                                                         
9 ‘Users’ in this sense includes appellants and respondents and therefore encompasses government 
decision makers, individual appellants and representatives. In a broader sense “users’ would 
include the tribunal judiciary and, of no little importance, the executive, in the shape of the 
government, which makes proposals for and ensures the passage of the legislation. 
10 Tribunals, however, have a very much higher case load than comparable courts. The First – tier 
Tribunals broadly correspond to the County Court. In 2011, for example, the County Court dealt 
with 52,660 civil cases. In that time, however, the First – tier Social Security and Child Support 
Tribunal alone dealt with 380,200 appeals. 
11 Darbyshire quotes a district judge as saying ‘Apparently, immigration adjudicators want to be 
called judges now – who’d want to do a job like that?’(Darbyshire 2011: 406) That illustrates the 
divide between the court and the tribunal judge. The district judge evidently did not appreciate that 
immigration adjudicators (now immigration judges) often decide asylum appeals, in which there 
are real issues of threat to life and liberty if the asylum seeker were to be returned to their home 
country. Darbyshire also pejoratively comments, without supporting evidence or explanation, that 
calling immigration adjudicators judges  was ‘an undisguised attempt to manipulate the diversity 
statistics’. (Darbyshire 2011: 25). 
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‘Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow 
the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in 
sorting out the enduring values of a society… (Bickel 1962: 25). In the real, 
pressured, world of a full time judge that proposition was no more than a counsel 
of perfection. The transition from career to fee paid (part time) judge has, however, 
enabled me to see things from a different perspective, that of a scholar practitioner, 
not just practitioner per se. That perspective has permitted a new, reflective, 
opportunity, enhanced by my continued sitting as a part time immigration judge, at 
first instance level. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Becoming - and remaining - a Judge 
 
 
The academic route for me into the judiciary was GCEs at a College of Further 
Education then a London External LLB at what is now Nottingham Trent 
University. Articles of Clerkship (now ‘trainee solicitor’), followed in a West 
Midlands high street firm, and then solicitors’ final examinations at the College of 
Law. 
 
After a period as an assistant solicitor I became a partner in a high street firm in the 
East Midlands. I dealt with civil and criminal litigation, often with legally aided 
clients, from the same socio – economic background as many benefit claimants.  
 
Private practice experience proved invaluable to judicial work, as it helped me 
understand the needs, perceptions and problems of clients, giving me an insight 
into their lives. 
 
It was rare in the 1980s (I obtained my first judicial post in 1984, at the age of 35) 
for solicitors, and those of my age group, to achieve judicial appointment. I was 41 
on my first full time appointment, and 46 on promotion to my Upper Tribunal post.  
 
It is unlikely that I would be thought to conform to the judicial type Griffith had in 
mind when, speaking of the judicial conception of public policy (apt in benefit 
cases) he said ‘It concerns first, the interest of the State, including its moral 
welfare and the preservation of law and order, broadly interpreted: secondly, the 
protection of property rights; and thirdly the promotion of certain political views 
normally associated with the Conservative Party’. (Griffith 1985: 198). 
 
He also said ‘The judiciary reflects the interests of its own class ... tenderness 
towards private property and dislike of trade unions, strong adherence to the 
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maintenance of order, distaste for minority opinions, demonstrations and protests, 
support of governmental secrecy, concern for the preservation of the moral and 
social behaviour to which it is accustomed… judges do not stand out as protectors 
of liberty, or of the rights of man, of the underprivileged’. (Griffith 1985: 205). 
Astonishingly, these comments were expressed as recently as 1985. They could 
just as easily have described a Victorian judge. 
 
Commentators often assume all judges sit in the formal court structure so judges in 
the tribunal world are often overlooked and are in the shadow of the “uniformed” 
branch. This has an impact on morale and, arguably, on terms and conditions of 
appointment, which I address in a different chapter. 
  
Appearing before a judge when I first qualified was somewhat alarming since 
many had a (deserved) reputation for irascibility and arrogance. That had a lasting 
impact on me. It does no good to make parties (or representatives) apprehensive or 
to erect any other sort of barrier to effective hearings. In consequence I have 
always sought to be user friendly. Civility and pleasantness cost nothing and are 
often worth their weight in gold – they make for easier hearings. 
In Towards a Theorization of Craft (Kritzer 2007 (16) 321) H M Kritzer lists a 
number of factors that influenced judges in doing their job, including experiences 
in practice (especially working with nice and nasty role models), status awareness 
and socialization among their peer group, whether they were a solicitor or barrister, 
experiences in court and behaviour of others towards them, education and domestic 
circumstances. All of these, to a greater or lesser extent, were present in my case. 
I was initially appointed as a part time judge. The more judging I did the more I 
liked it. I felt suited to it. I liked the authority and status, and the relative 
informality of it all, contrasted to the rigid formalism of what I had experienced as 
a practitioner in the court system. I also derived continuing satisfaction from 
successfully going through a searching and exacting selection procedure (then, as 
now, most applicants were unsuccessful) and knowing I was a judge, to that extent 
set apart from most of my contemporaries and colleagues.  
In due course I was appointed full time, and after a few years appointed a deputy 
Social Security and Child Support Commissioner, only the second tribunal judge to 
obtain such an appointment. That reinforced my job satisfaction and sense of self 
worth. I was able to see the end to end process of appeals to the first level tribunal 
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and then how further appeals were dealt with by a higher judicial body. 
I continued to enjoy the work but, over a few years, became increasingly aware 
that all was not well in ‘the system.’ There were a number of reasons: it was then 
routine for tribunal presidents to be appointed from the ranks of circuit judges, with 
no tribunal experience. The appointments were for a limited period, usually about 
three years. New presidents of tribunals often felt the need to make changes 
(without first gaining a feel for the jurisdiction) and, in wanting to leave a legacy, 
often sought to reinvent the wheel.  
I had an increasing sense that tribunal judges were regarded by those who ought to 
have known better as tribunal hacks in the judicial world. This feeling was 
reinforced when, as the inaugural Chairman of the Council of Tribunal Judges, I 
had a meeting with one such president. He told me that increased funding had been 
obtained from the DSS (in those days the sponsoring body) but that the price was 
that tribunal judges had to be more productive. It seemed manifestly wrong to me 
that one of the parties in most appeals should be able to dictate terms in that way. It 
offended my notion of fairness, in that those in positions of power and influence 
(the DSS in this case) should be able to prevail over the relatively powerless 
(claimants). Also, it went contrary to the very notion of judicial independence and 
it was galling that civil servants, with no training or interest in the law or justice, 
should be in a position to affect my working life in that way. 
Moreover, the attitude of civil servants towards judges changed. The relationship 
had always been a form of partnership, but many did not recognize that 
partnerships are not always equal. The relationship changed from civil servants 
being the servants of (but not servile to) the judiciary to seeing themselves as prime 
movers in the machinery of justice, with judges being no more than resources like 
any other. Resource allocation was in the hands of the civil service. That meant 
that nominal hearing times and, in consequence, daily lists and workload, were set 
by them, with no effective consultation with the judiciary. The judiciary were 
heavily dependent on the civil service administrators, but had no power over them. 
If, then, regular and frequent problems arose which directly impacted upon judicial 
work (inadequate premises, hearing bundles incompletely copied, bad liaison with 
appellants and other users and so on) all the judiciary could do was to make 
representations to administrators, but with no sanction for failure to comply. That 
was frustrating. Increasingly I felt that administrators regarded administration as an 
end in itself, as opposed to a service to be provided to tribunal users (including the 
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judiciary) in achieving the end product, a decision on an appeal.  
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that different drivers are in play: judges 
want to judge and their salaries are unaffected by output or result. That is alien to 
the civil service mindset, with numbers dictating success or failure, in 
organizational and individual terms.  
At an annual Tribunal Service judicial conference the then Chief Executive (a 
member of the senior civil service) herself said ‘you will never persuade the civil 
service to understand the difference between output and outcome.’ Just so. This 
problem has worsened over the years, with increasing emphasis on targets and key 
indicators in performance related pay. Little or no realistic evaluation is made by 
the modern Ministry of Justice official of whether these methods really do add 
value to the system, or whether they are in reality crude and unreliable. As one 
legal officer (as they then were) to the Commissioners put it, ‘a moving file is a 
happy file.’ There you have it. 
So, I thought these problems might be removed by elevation to a higher judicial 
level. In this I was encouraged by a full time colleague, who had recently become 
the first full time tribunal judge to be appointed a Commissioner. The problems 
were lessened because the new appointment was in a smaller and more cohesive 
judicial organization. The higher standing of the judges was acknowledged by the 
administrators and day to day organizational problems could more easily be 
recognized and addressed, as the judiciary and administrators had a more focused 
and closer working relationship.  
The larger the judicial organization the larger the numbers of civil servants and the 
greater the gap between the realities of judicial work in the field and the constraints 
and considerations imposed by a hierarchy of administrative functions and the 
concerns of the senior judiciary at the head of the judicial organization. The latter 
understandably have to concern themselves with some administrative matters 
(adjournment rates, work forecasts, judicial personnel issues and the like) and have 
to interact at high level with administrators. This may tend to blur the distinction 
between a judge and an administrator. 
One of the problems with dealing with ‘pure law’ day in and day out, especially 
when many upper tribunal appeals are decided without a hearing, is tedium and 
repetition. I did, however, come to appreciate that there is no such thing as ‘just 
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another appeal.’ The range of issues, the regular changes in the law and the variety 
of people’s lives prevent ennui. To paraphrase Mark Antony (Shakespeare 
Anthony and Cleopatra Act II Sc II) ‘Age cannot wither nor custom stale their 
infinite variety…’ I learned over time that what might at first blush seem yet 
another ‘standard’ appeal is in fact no such thing. One might think, for example, 
that ordinary words such as ‘provided by’ would be so straightforward in their 
meaning as not to permit of or require great debate or elucidation. Think again, and 
see what happened in Appendix N. There is always something special about each 
case and that served to maintain interest and keep me on my toes.  
That is not to say that, at the outset of an appeal, I did not have a preliminary view. 
As a colleague rightly said, ‘One approaches an appeal with an open mind, but not 
an empty one.’ There is also the danger of being ground down by, for example, 
voluminous submissions, repetitious and tendentious arguments and in some cases 
the seeming inability of the parties to refrain from further written submissions as 
the case progresses. I learned to mitigate this by a firm hold of the reins of the 
appeal and not allowing the parties to seize them from my grasp and go galloping 
off into the distance. I have always remembered words of advice once given, to rise 
above and to cut through the dross and irrelevances like the captain of an 
icebreaker steering a course through the pack ice.  
Judges cannot win: at one extreme they are as characterized by Griffith, but at the 
other extreme are in conflict with the government, suggestive of a much more 
liberal outlook. The then Home Secretary said that he was ‘…frankly fed up with 
judges overturning policy…’ (Blunkett 2003). Similarly the current Home 
Secretary12 has often criticized judges for being soft on human rights, in the field 
of asylum law. The essential point, though, is that judges are concerned with the 
law, which is accessible and arises from the democratic process of the enaction of 
legislation. Policy, on the other hand, is nebulous, varies from minister to minister 
and from day to day, depending on which way the political wind blows. 
 
Most people have no accurate conception of judges: ‘I am struck by how 
unrealistic are the conceptions of the judge held by most people, including 
practising lawyers and eminent law professors…and even by some judges.’(Posner 
2010: 2) ‘They’re just old men,’ ‘fuddy old,’ ‘very old,’ ‘doddery old guy,’ 
‘pompous old weirdos’, ‘really outdated’. (Darbyshire 2011: 19). A judge said that                                                         
12 Rt Hon Theresa May MP 
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most people regarded judges as ‘stuffy old farts and completely out of touch…a 
bunch of idiots’ (Darbyshire 2011: 19). The image that most people have of judges 
derives from fiction or selective news reports, resulting in a negative stereotype. 
One remembers the Rowan Atkinson ‘What is a digital watch’ judge. Darbyshire 
reinforces this view in that ‘The media image of the judge is negative in the 
extreme – old, white and male, which is accurate – but also privileged, insensitive 
and out of touch . (Darbyshire 2011: 42). It is apparent from the brief resume of my 
background, above, that I do not sit easily with the views of Griffith or Darbyshire. 
 
Apart from my academic background my socio economic background may have 
suggested a different perspective: My parents were factory workers and both of my 
grandfathers were miners, one dying in a mining accident. I have, then, had a 
certain empathy with industrial injuries claimants (Appendix J is just such a case) 
and those from less privileged backgrounds. That, however, does not translate into 
partiality, as is also apparent from Appendix J. It is easily tempting to say that this 
does not affect my judgments. Of course, I was not consciously partial. Empathy 
may be thought to be a good judicial quality, distinct from sympathy, which may 
suggest an identification with the situation of the claimant.  
 
No judge, however, lives in a sterile environment, unaffected by the realities of 
life. Nor should they. These realities, however, may conspire to affect outlook, 
philosophy of life and society and economic considerations. Benjamin Cardozo, 
the distinguished American judge and jurist, recognized this in saying that judges 
could not escape from the current which shapes their lives and opinions so that ‘All 
their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging 
at them – inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the 
result is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs…which, when reasons are 
nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall.’(Cardozo 1921:2) ‘Social 
needs’ are inherent in the Welfare State. Not only the needs of its beneficiaries but 
also those of the contributors to the coffers. If one accepts Cardozo’s precepts, 
then, it may be arguable that my background better equips me to do the work I did 
than, say, a public school Oxbridge judge. That said I remind myself that ‘…a 
judge would err… if he were to impose upon the community as a rule of life his 
own idiosyncracies of conduct or belief.’ (Cardozo 1921: 34). 
 
The European jurist E Ehrlich reflects Cardozo in that ‘In the long run there is no 
guaranty of justice, except the personality of the judge.’(Ehrlich 1911 (9) 45). 
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Personality, though, has restricted significance in tightly regulated and 
circumscribed welfare law. Judicial personality might, in a finely balanced case, tip 
the scales in an area of law which is fluid and uncertain. Welfare law though is in a 
different category, increasingly governed by regulation, leaving little room for the 
exercise of personality. That is not necessarily bad, otherwise the outcome of a 
case might be dictated by the personality of the judge, not the law. 
 
There may be a distinction between judicial personality and character, the former 
perhaps showing a flair in working which has no material effect on outcome, the 
latter deriving from life experience and affecting how and what decisions are made. 
There is an increasing tendency for the Government to adopt mechanistic 
techniques for decision making. If, for example, a person scores a certain number 
of points they will get the benefit claimed. Purely automated decision making has 
not yet arrived, and in any event although a computer can make a decision it cannot 
exercise judgment. That is why society needs judges. 
 
Judicial character is not determinative of outcome but, I suggest, affects process 
(user friendliness, phraseology in decisions and so on) and understanding. The 
latter in turn affects empathy and evaluation of evidence and, in this way, outcome. 
For example, in one appeal the appellant sought to explain loss of a large sum of 
money (which could have resulted in no benefit award) by saying he lost it 
gambling. That was outwith my life experience and I was sceptical, so I consulted 
a colleague, a highly experienced Old Bailey judge, who had seen that scenario 
many times. I changed my mind.  
 
That shows the value of judicial ‘eldership’, drawing on the wisdom and 
experience of colleagues, and having the humility to do so. It shows also the 
benefit of judges being drawn from different areas of practice. My family 
experience of factory work, and my own vacation experience as a student, showed 
me what went on in the real world, so I was aware of the working conditions and 
social problems of claimants. Personal and family experience of mental health 
problems gave me an understanding of how difficult these are to assess (as distinct 
from physical problems) and how they act as barriers to effective communication 
when evidence is given. Similarly, experience of a family member as a lower 
tribunal judge reminded me of the importance of not being patronizing in 
judgments, of being aware of the real problems faced by judging at that level and 
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taking the lower tribunal with me in the judgment, and not alienating it by speaking 
from Mount Olympus. 
 
Until recently I held the traditional view that judges have no responsibility for the 
making of law, only its interpretation and application. The perspective of 
retirement, however, has given me a different insight. It comes from a realization 
that ‘Government is no longer a passive decision maker with limited policy goals 
merely focused upon the preservation of social order…much of the work of modern 
government now involves managing large scale administrative programmes and 
systems to deliver and implement an enormous number of disparate and complex 
policy objectives.’ (Thomas 2011: 103) As Thomas rightly goes on to say, tribunal 
adjudication is an institutional process by which public policy can be administered. 
In a real sense, then, I have been a participant in a process of implementation of 
policy. That makes me uncomfortable as it challenges judicial independence. 
 
The judiciary is under threat as never before, because successive governments are 
unhappy when they perceive judges to be flouting policy. That in turn often leads 
to tabloid style condemnation of judges, who are unable to answer back. As Lord 
Neuberger 13 acknowledged, ministers attacking judges was ‘not a happy 
situation…it’s not fair as judges can’t answer back…it’s not sensible...’ 
(Neuberger 2013) because the Government could appeal or Parliament could 
change the law. All of this leads to some frustration on the part of judges and gives 
a sense that they are undervalued, at least by politicians.  
 
As Rozenberg (2013) says ‘Future historians will no doubt date the steady decline 
in legal services from the legal aid cuts that [started in April 2013]. Perhaps April 
2013 will also mark the beginning of a steady decline in the quality of the 
judiciary.’ No one in today’s climate will feel sorry for the judges. Whether 
members of the public may have cause to feel sorry for themselves time will tell. It 
may also be that the quality of judges will decline, given recruitment problems 
likely to arise from new judicial pension arrangements, leading to cuts in judicial 
pensions between 34% - 46%. Lord Judge, giving evidence to the Senior Salaries 
Review Body,14 expressed concern that ‘…by making it harder to recruit the best                                                         
13 President of the Supreme Court 
14 The public body charged with making independent recommendations about salaries in the senior 
civil service, the armed forces and the judiciary. The latest report stated that the SSRB was more 
concerned about the impact of the Government’s pay policies on the judiciary than on senior civil 
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judges, the changes could affect the quality of the justice system…’ (Judge 2013) 
The average citizen could, understandably, probably not care less about judges’ 
salaries or pensions, but he or she would no doubt want good quality judges and it 
is this that may be under threat. In a speech marking his retirement the Lord Chief 
Justice expressed concerns about judicial recruitment, saying that ‘..the expansion 
of the responsibilities now placed on the judiciary, allied to the less attractive 
terms and conditions and pension arrangements as the Senior Salaries Review 
Body has made clear, has resulted in reduced morale.’ (Judge 2013). 
 
Quite apart from ministerial attacks on the judiciary there is a backdrop of a threat 
to judicial independence. The previous Lord Chief Justice has warned that the 
constitutional changes of the last government could pose future threats to judicial 
independence. Referring to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, 15  when 
‘spectacular changes to our constitutional arrangements were made,’ he warned of 
the need for vigilance against ‘totally unintended little steps, which might, in the 
long term, serve to undermine the principle of judicial independence...we must be 
cautious, meticulous in our scrutiny’. (Judge 2013).  For a Lord Chief Justice those 
words have a resonance and significance far greater than may be suggested by their 
civilized, measured, tone. 
 
His views are reflected in more robust terms by the former Director of ‘Justice’16: 
‘You do not need to be a conspiracy theorist to identify the wider picture of what 
ministers are up to. They are deploying a four fold strategy to get the genie of 
judicial scrutiny back in the bottle. First, they wanted secret courts to suppress 
embarrassing evidence. Second, they want to reduce legal aid. Third, they are 
attacking the Human Rights Act. Eventually they even talk of taking the UK out of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The current set of legal aid proposals 
will not just save money; they are intended to strengthen the state against the 
individual.’ (Smith 2013). Although s.3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
requires the Lord Chancellor, and other ministers, to ‘uphold the continued 
independence of the judiciary’ this may be a matter more of form than of 
                                                                                                                                                       
servants and the armed forces. In like vein Lord Neuberger warns that ‘As the gap between the 
earnings of successful lawyers and the judicial pay increases, maintaining high standards may 
prove hard’. (Neuberger 2013). 
15 Which, amongst other things, reformed the role of the Lord Chancellor, the post of Secretary of 
State for Justice being created in 2007 
16 Roger Smith 
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substance, given tabloid headlines about judgments not to the liking of the 
government.  
 
Profound changes have also been wrought not only in resource allocation in the 
machinery of justice, but in the very basis of the constitution, as Lord Judge 
indicated. Over many centuries the Lord Chancellor had evolved into a uniquely 
valuable feature of the constitution, as being not only the country’s most senior 
judge but also part of our constitution for hundreds of years. As Lord Neuberger 
put it the ‘old style Lord Chancellor was the country’s top judge, the Judiciary’s 
representative in the Cabinet, and the speaker of the House of Lords - a Grand 
Panjandrum or Lord High Everything Else.’ (Neuberger 2013). In some ways, 
then, he was able to act as an interface between the Judiciary and the Executive, 
being a judicial representative in the Cabinet and being familiar with the workings 
and concerns of the Judiciary. No longer.  
 
The place of the Judiciary in our unwritten constitution should not be 
underestimated. Lord Neuberger holds that the Judiciary comes second only to the 
Legislature (Parliament) in the branches of State, in that the Judiciary holds the 
third branch, the Executive (the Government) to account. 
 
Judges are in a unique position in society. Becoming a judge is difficult and 
increasing general and specific job pressures make judging challenging, rewarding, 
irritating and a source of pride. No other job in the world offers these opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
The Welfare Benefits Landscape 
 
 
The foundations of the modern welfare state were laid by the Beveridge Report. 
(Beveridge 1942).17  Beveridge identified a number of evils, which are still present 
albeit in different form, such as mental health conditions and a continuing focus on 
‘ignorance’ and  unemployment (‘idleness’).  
 
Welfare benefits touch us all:’…the more fortunate, whether they like it or not, 
provide help as contributions or tax payments (or both) for those entitled to 
benefits or allowances…nobody can just ‘pass by on the other side’ says a former 
Chief Social Security Commissioner (Micklethwait 1974:4).  The law applicable to 
welfare benefits is particularly dense, because of its sheer volume, the arcane and 
highly technical language used, as well as the increasing interdependence of 
primary and secondary legislation. 
 
The current Secretary of State for Work and Pensions18 perceptively notes that 
2012 marked the 70th anniversary of the Beveridge Report, and says it is his aim to 
reform the benefit system to bring it back to Beveridge’s principles, although he 
does not say what he understands these to be. He acknowledges that ‘over the last 
70 years countless Acts of Parliament and many thousands of pieces of subordinate 
legislation have been added’ with the result that ‘we now have a mess of a benefits 
system that is incomprehensible.’ (Duncan Smith 2014). Indeed, even those in the 
Executive who are responsible for the legislation are confused by it. Writing in The                                                         
17 1942 Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services Cmd 
6464 HMSO 
18 Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP 
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Daily Telegraph on 7 August 2013 the (then) Minister for Disabled People 19 
appeared not to know the (material) difference between disability living allowance 
and employment and support allowance, two of the more common forms of 
benefit. What hope, then, for Joe Public?  
 
Not for nothing did a former Lord Chancellor refer to the ‘impenetrable jungle of 
social security benefits’. (Hailsham 1992: 103). Perhaps we could learn much from 
the continental system of codification of law in certain areas and the comparative 
brevity of many continental statutes.20 
 
‘The legislation’s the usual bugger’s muddle.’(Deed 2007). 
 It is not open to me or other judges simply to throw up my hands in despair and 
declare I cannot make head or tail of a piece of legislation, however badly drafted, 
obscure, ambiguous or byzantine in its convolutions.  
 
There are obvious difficulties in seeking to extrapolate principles and practices 
from Beveridge’s day without some recognition of, and allowances for, changing 
societal and economic factors.  
 
The profound divisions in views on welfare benefits in modern society create 
problems for the judge in welfare law. Deep differences of view abound between 
individuals, organisations and governments in this area of law. Any proposed 
change to benefit law is likely to be met with fierce debate and criticism.  
 
Whilst I, as a judge, was not concerned with government policy, only the 
application of the law, since I live in the real world I am not immune to concerns of 
users of the benefit system on the one hand and those (individuals and society at 
large) who have diametrically opposed views. Indeed, in very many cases 
appellants are keen to make it plain that they do not fall into the category of 
‘scrounger’ and often cite nonspecific cases of those, known to them, whom they 
think are.  
 
                                                        
19 Rt Hon Esther McVey MP 
20 In Legislative Drafting: A New Approach  (1997, London, Butterworths) Sir William Dale 
looked at various areas of law in the UK and continental countries and established that continental 
statutes were between a fifth and a third as long as ours. 
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All of this leads to pressure on myself and other judges, insidious and difficult to 
quantify but nonetheless real. As Pannick observed, ‘Judges are subject to the 
same ambitions, passions, prejudices and fears as their contemporaries. If you 
prick them they bleed’. (Pannick 1987; 17). The consequence of this is an ever 
present need, which needs reinforcing from time to time, to be vigilant about 
avoiding stereotypes, judging each case entirely on its own merits and focusing on 
the relevant legislative provisions and evidence. This effectively provides a 
reassuringly protective cordon sanitaire type of environment in which to fulfil my 
judicial duties. 
 
That does not mean, however, a monolithically cold and distanced judicial 
loftiness. Judges are humans, not automatons. One may have empathy with an 
appellant without judgment being compromised. One may also have personal 
knowledge or experience of the benefits system without being partial. I 
remembered that both of my grandfathers were miners and that both of my parents 
were factory workers. I have had vacation jobs in factories. This experience of the 
real world, so far from being an obstacle to the judicial function, in my view 
enhanced and facilitated it. Why? I think the answer lies partly in the words of 
Lord Mansfield, an 18th century judge: ‘Judges need humour, humanity and 
humility, together with fairness, formality and firmness..’ Humanity often springs 
from an awareness of the personal, and one’s own experience. This, and some of 
these other qualities, can temper a decision dismissing an appeal, by the use of 
suitable language, or lead to probing and relevant questioning in an oral hearing. 
The Judicial Appointments Commission website lists among judicial qualities 
intellectual capacity, efficiency, integrity, objectiveness, decisiveness and so on but 
in my view being a good judge requires more than the sum total of these qualities. 
In the area of social security law in particular a human awareness is needed. That is 
easier said than done. 
 
Judging in the field of welfare law is challenging, demanding and may profoundly 
affect people’s lives. These factors present difficulties and rewards in judicial work 
in this area. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Judicial decision making, what it involves and is it successful? 
 
 
There are a number of elements of a good judicial decision, and a number of 
techniques and methodologies available to make one. 
 
Social awareness 
 
Lady Justice Arden believes judges need social awareness.21 Judges in the past 
have been criticized for being remote from society in terms of education and social 
background. A distinction may, however, be drawn between general and case 
specific awareness.  
 
 Arden: ‘Judges must be able to demonstrate that they understand the context in 
which their decisions are being made…the judiciary needs to understand people in 
different walks of life and in different cultures [and] an awareness of social 
concerns so that their judgments can respond to them.’ (Arden 2011). So, she 
argues, social awareness avoids the perception that the best decisions are not made 
‘…so long as the judiciary appear to be drawn from one group in society and so 
long as it appears that diversity is welcomed in principle but is often not found in 
practice.’ 
                                                         
21‘Magna Carta and the Judges – realizing the Vision’ Lecture given at Royal Holloway, 
University of London, June 2011. The Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, 2010, 
also proposed that there should be a requirement in the selection criteria of judges to show that 
they have social awareness. 
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Arden suggests that social awareness can be demonstrated by judges being able to 
‘explain their decisions in accessible language so that the important parts can be 
read and understood by laypeople, and not just by other lawyers. Judges have to 
balance their technical and theoretical reasoning with the practical so that the law 
can be applied without difficulty.’ (Arden 2011). All that is easier to state than to 
achieve in practice, especially in the highly technical and arcane jurisdiction of the 
Upper Tribunal. 
 
So, how could I as a judge of the Upper Tribunal, demonstrate social awareness? I 
could not, for example, tell claimants to look at my Who’s Who entry, to see what 
sort of education I had, I could not properly tell them about my family background 
and it was no good simply assuring them that I did possess social awareness. This 
can only be demonstrated by what I did as a judge and how I did it.  
 
Good judgment 
 
This should be distinguished from a good decision. Even if a judge possesses good 
judgment he can write a bad decision if the exercise of that judgment is not 
explained or is technically incorrect. It is also distinguishable from experience 
(although in many cases the two go hand in hand) and, although judges need it, it is 
difficult to show since it involves and is influenced by so many diverse factors. It is 
‘an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of empathy, modesty, maturity, 
a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of human limitations, sanity, 
prudence, a sense of reality, and common sense.’ (Posner 2010; 117). (Appendix G 
may be thought an example of a humane judgment, embodying and applying some 
of these factors). That is a frightening (but non exhaustive) list, because if it is true, 
as it must be, that ‘as much as any human being a judge is merely a choosing 
organism of limited knowledge and ability’ (Simon 1955: (69) 119) it would be a 
counsel of perfection to expect all judges always to measure up to Posner’s criteria. 
 
Although the presence of the above qualities cannot be measured their absence is 
observable. In other words in large part those qualities may be shown to the outside 
world by the way in which parties are treated and in simple ways such as an 
acknowledgment, however brief, in the judgment of any difficulties faced by either 
party, even if not strictly relevant. Similarly, irrespective of the outcome of an 
appeal, the type of language, syntax and construction of a judgment can play a part.  
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“I will do right to all manner of people…” 
 
So runs part of the judicial oath. ‘Right’ may be seen as an inseparable part of 
justice. The law should be interpreted and applied to reflect what is ‘right ‘, but 
‘right’ equated with morality is subject to societal change and re-evaluation from  
 
time to time. This should not in theory give rise to difficulties since the judge, as 
Devlin says, is not ‘required to make any judgment about what is good and what is 
bad. The morals which he enforces are those ideas about right and wrong which 
are already accepted by…society’ so long as, in this scenario, the judge (or 
legislator) has regard to what is ‘acceptable to the ordinary man, who might also 
be called the reasonable man or the right-minded man.’(Devlin 1965: 196). This 
reflects the principle that law mirrors society, and should be enacted and applied 
accordingly. 
 
The difficulty, though, is that in matters of welfare law society does not speak 
uniformly. Any ‘mirror’ reflecting the views of society in this area of law would 
present such a distorted picture that it could not clearly be seen. 22  Thus, in 
decision making in welfare law matters resort cannot be had, as an aid to 
construction or application of the law, to any ‘cohesive sentiment’23 felt by society, 
since there is none. Indeed, although social theorists like Durkheim 24  and 
Habermas25 agree that law serves the function of integrating society it is arguable 
that in today’s pluralism and societal pressures welfare law may have the opposite 
effect, as being perceived by many to act pejoratively against the interests of 
claimants on the one hand or, on the other, tax payers who do not claim benefits. 
 
In my view, the ‘mirror’ theory of law has no place in modern welfare law. That 
may be no bad thing, since the ability to decide by reference to some generalized 
national mores or norms would be subjective. Even though Tamanaha suggests that 
‘since the legal actors themselves are members of that society, presumably to some 
degree their decisions and actions will reflect…prevailing social values’ 
(Tamanaha 2001: 75) judges may take as representative of the views of society 
what those in the judicial community take as representative, by reference to their                                                         
22 Law acting as a mirror of society was a metaphor used by the American jurist Oliver Wendell 
Holmes 
23 Frankfurter J in Minserville School District v Gobitis 310 US 586 
24 Durkheim, E 1893 The Division of Labour in Society  Paris, Presses Universitaires de France  
25 Habermas, J 1996 Between Facts and Norms  Massachusetts, MIT Press  
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own experience and values, which may not be representative at all. It must surely 
be right that ‘a judge has to decide a case in accordance with the law and nothing 
else…a judge is not entitled to impose his or her subjective views of what is 
morally right or wrong on society’. (Singh 2013). 
 
This effectively deprives me of a judicial tool for the interpretation of the law. I 
overcome this by resorting to ‘black letter’ interpretation, by simply looking at the 
words used in the statute, without the superimposition of extra judicial constraints 
such as societal norms and contemporary mores. This is what Devlin calls ‘positive 
law,’ (Devlin 1965: 67) (or legal positivism) and which Tamanaha describes as 
“the ‘imperative’ or ‘will’ theory’ of law.(Tamanaha 2001: 4). In an appeal before 
the Upper Tribunal the starting point has to be whether the lower tribunal has, first, 
identified the relevant law and, if so, second, whether it has been correctly applied.  
 
I take comfort from the fact that the ‘legalist’ or ‘positivist’ theory of judging is 
described as the judiciary’s “official” theory of judicial behaviour by Posner, so 
that ‘judicial decisions are determined by ‘the law,’ conceived of as a body of pre-
existing rules, found stated in canonical legal materials, such as statutory texts and 
previous decisions of the same or higher court, or derivable from those materials 
by logical operations’. (Posner 2010: 41). To my mind that description is a good 
‘fit’ with what I did and how I did it, although no judge consciously decides that he 
or she will be an adherent of any particular theory of judging. That is something 
that has only become apparent to me from taking a long view, away from the 
pressures of day to day judging.  
 
Although some decisions in the Upper Tribunal are made by a panel of (usually 
three) judges most are made by judges sitting alone. This has the positive effect of 
removing any influence on judicial making by, for example, group think.26 The 
downside is that it is often reassuring to have other judges on the panel agree with 
me. True, a sounding board may be other judges with whom I discussed a case 
which I had to decide alone but that did not altogether mitigate the consequences of 
this ‘isolationist’ type of judging. It did, however, free me from unwanted 
extraneous factors of the type I have indicated.  
                                                         
26  ‘Dissenting judgments often do more harm than good: they detract from collegiality, they may 
lead to selective and unrepresentative extracts being cited in other cases and they may engender 
further appeals’ (Posner 2010: 32). 
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Contents of the Judicial Toolkit 
 
A workman needs a variety of tools, and so did I have judicial tools as an aid to 
decision making. There is nothing telling me which ‘tool’ is best suited for the job 
in hand. Despite various techniques of interpretation often a high degree of 
intuition is involved.  
 
One such technique is reasoning by analogy. This is no more than a judicialised 
version of something we all do regularly. As Weinreb27 points out, however, there 
is a material difference between analogical reasoning in daily life – either the 
problem is solved or it is not – and in the law, in which the analogy cannot be 
tested experimentally. There is nothing novel in this form of reasoning which, in 
effect, is but an aspect of the doctrine of precedent, in which decisions of higher 
judicial authorities bind lower ones. Appendix O shows the application of 
precedent, and that interpretations used in earlier, replaced, legislation can still be 
valid. 
 
Although welfare law, as other law, requires methods of intellectual practice (the 
assembly of evidence, arguing a case, citing precedents and so on) these are 
matters more of form than of intellectual disciplinarity since, as Cotterell says, 
there are no ‘controlling master theories, distinctive methods of intellectual debate, 
established paradigms of research practice, familiar epistemological and 
ontological positions or controversies.’ (Cotterell 2006). This does not mean, 
though, that in decision making I was lost at sea without a chart or compass. Those 
aids to navigation are present in the nature and form of welfare law itself. It is not 
dependent on legitimation by reference to external factors and is a stand alone 
creation, to be analysed and interpreted as such. That is in the very nature of 
positive law.  
 
Welfare law is heavily circumscribed and prescriptive. Its plasticity lies not just in 
its byzantine complexity and impenetrable language (although these are fruitful 
sources of litigation) but in its rapidity of change. In many instances little room is 
left for individual judicial influence. If, for example, Parliament decides that the 
mobility component of disability living allowance is not available to those over the 
age of 65, or if Parliament sets time limits for claims, it was not for me to decide                                                         
27 Weinreb, L 2005 Legal Reason  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press  
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otherwise, irrespective of personal feelings. In any event even if I were empowered 
to reflect what Cardozo calls ‘the spirit of the age’ that would be problematic, since 
that is ‘too often only the spirit of the group in which the accidents of birth or 
education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place. No effort or 
revolution of mind will overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of these 
subconscious loyalties.’(Cardozo 1921: 34). 
 
That welfare law is a paradigm of positive law is, I believe, a strength of the 
system, since the law should be certain. It assists me: if every appeal involved 
novel points of law judicial life would be unacceptably stressful and complex – 
judges need a diet of the (relatively) straightforward blended with the more 
complex. Additionally prescriptive law means I do not have to agonise about 
subjective personal influences. Posner describes these as ‘Priors’, and they include 
things like ‘experience, temperament, ideology or other personal, nonlegalist 
factors…[which are] …ubiquitous and uneliminable.’(Posner 2010: 69). That does 
not mean, though, that I had to think in a vacuum and in any event the positivist 
approach I have indicated has what are effectively built in safeguards against 
‘Priors.’  
 
What, though, about appeals in which I strongly felt that justice had not been done? 
Did this pose a dilemma and if so how did I address it? 
 
It was satisfying when I was able to make a decision curing the ‘injustice’, in the 
incorrect application of the law or in some procedural unfairness. In other cases 
‘justice’ or the lack of it is more problematic: an appellant may feel a result is 
‘unjust’ if it does not give him what he wants or if a claim fails on some arcane 
technicality. Absent any overriding human rights issues, however, my job begins 
and ends with the law. It was not for me to second guess Parliament or to substitute 
my own all too fallible and subjective concepts of right and wrong.  
 
So, in general, subjective opinion or that which may be thought to reflect standards 
in society, have no place in welfare law. The concepts of moral reprehensibility, 
blameworthiness and the like are, in general, irrelevant. For example, entitlement 
to Disability Living Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance takes no 
account of the cause of entitlement. If, say, the effects of drug or alcohol 
dependency mean that a person needs ‘attention in connection with bodily 
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functions’ steps that they could reasonably have taken to avoid or mitigate the 
consequences of their actions are immaterial. 
 
What, though, about a case in which the lower tribunal has made an award of 
benefit which, by any standards, may not in reality be for the good of the claimant? 
A claimant dependent on alcohol may well use the money awarded to buy alcohol. 
Thus, the award fuels the very dependency which resulted in entitlement. In such 
cases, I was powerless. That may seem counterintuitive but it may be just as well, 
otherwise I would be a judge in a court of morals, not law. The furthest I could go 
in an appropriate case would be to make a time limited award (as opposed to an 
indefinite award) but only if the evidence reasonably suggested the possibility of 
material improvement in the underlying condition. 
 
All of this is not to say that I was no more than an automaton, because although I 
had no power to change the law I did have power to ensure its correct interpretation 
and application. I had no discretion about changing the law but I have a form of 
discretion in the way it is applied. ‘A form of discretion’ only because judicial 
interpretation is a type of discretion, albeit fettered by rules of interpretation. As 
Martin28 puts it, in making a decision a judge has both freedom and constraint: 
freedom in the sense that to make a judgment involves some form of choice, and 
constraint because judgment is a matter of deliberation, of weighing alternatives 
within the parameters of the law. 
 
Was I chained by the ever increasing prescriptive terms of welfare law? After all 
one definition of ‘judge’ is ‘form an opinion or conclusion about.’ Arguably, the 
greater the prescription the less scope for judgment. In fact, in my view, the 
contrary is true. That is because the concomitant of greater prescription is greater 
volume. Both conspire to produce questions of interpretation, ambiguity and 
uncertainty. 
 
In one area, though, my discretion had a wider writ: if I was asked for an 
adjournment of a case, or when giving case management directions, I had to 
consider “the interests of justice,” although in general, as Singh says, ‘ a black 
letter lawyer would search in vain for a definition of the interests of 
justice…’(Singh 2013). That is because it cannot be circumscribed except in                                                         
28 Martin, W 2008  Theories of Judgment, Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
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specific instances. In this I had freedom to move within what Posner describes as a 
‘Zone of reasonableness.’ (Posner 2010: 87). It is in the very nature of 
‘reasonableness’ that it is variable according to circumstance. It is not absolute, 
fixed or determined by forensic criteria. 
 
Greater experience leads to greater confidence in what is in large part an intuitive 
process of consideration of ‘the interests of justice.’ This, however, conceals an 
inherent danger, since intuition derives from the unconscious, not conscious, mind, 
and if ‘the unconscious mind has greater capacity than the conscious mind…[so 
that]…the knowledge accessible to intuition is likely to be vast ’(Posner 2010: 108) 
 it follows that the exercise of intuition is not readily susceptible to examination 
and may be flawed, even though outwardly sustainable. It is relatively easy to 
guard against conscious factors but, as most judges ‘but slenderly know 
[themselves]’(Shakespeare King Lear Act 1 Sc 1) more difficult to guard against 
unconscious influences. That, though, is an inevitable consequence of decision 
making by humans. It is particularly present in judicial decisions, since those 
decisions do not depend upon any algorithmic, sequential or formulaic deliberative 
procedure, and are in consequence a form of telescoped, not step - by - step 
decision making. 
 
Is it odd that the judicial toolkit does not contain a ‘justice’ tool? Judges strive to 
achieve justice in the broad sense of a fair hearing, proper application of the law 
and procedures and so on. In a philosophical sense, however, the ‘justice’ in an 
individual case is impossible to discern, absent the application of general 
principles. In a pluralistic society, and in the area of welfare benefits, it may be that 
no sense of justice pervades the community, since the community is fractured into 
many different and often irreconcilable communities, with the result that ‘justice’ 
is unknowable. 
 
But what about Policy? 
 
The Legislature and Executive make legislation in furtherance of the policy of the 
government of the day, so behind every legislative provision there is a purpose, 
reflecting policy. The distinction between purpose and policy is fine, but crucial, 
since I could properly take account of the latter, but not the former. Why? 
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Policy is nebulous, changing from minister to minister and from one day to the 
next. Interpretation by reference to policy would be inimical to legal certainty and 
transparency: ‘…adherence to the rule of law and a proper respect for the 
difference between legislation and adjudication dictate that the reasons be sought 
within the fabric of the law and not in the open spaces of policy and its efficient 
implementation.’ (Weinerb 2005: 36). Similarly, Posner says that ‘judges start with 
the words of the statute and usually end there, thus avoiding the treacherous shoals 
of purpose and policy…’ (Posner 2010: 72). The purpose of a provision, however, 
can be ascertained by its wording and a purposive construction, seeking to discern 
what the provision is designed to accomplish, is a permissible tool. Posner is right 
in that purpose cannot be derived from policy, but in my view it can be a stand 
alone technique, since a purposive approach is not dependent on an understanding 
or analysis of policy.  
 
Have my judgments been successful? 
 
Over 17 years as a judge of the Upper Tribunal I made about 3,000 decisions on 
appeals and determined about 7,000 applications for permission to appeal.29 Judges 
do not compare outputs with each other and the Ministry of Justice did not measure 
individual judicial performance in terms of statistics, and in any event it is easier to 
do a bad judgment quickly than a good judgment slowly. In crude terms I was 
successful in terms of output: I did what was placed in front of me, I did not ask 
other judges to do appeals which I found challenging and my cases did not linger 
on the back burner. So, by these measures I performed satisfactorily.  
 
What about outcome, though? Can judicial performance be evaluated by looking at 
indicators other than simple case disposal?  
 
If a scientist develops a new drug which successfully treats a medical condition, or 
makes a new discovery they will be thought to be successful, like Crick and 
Watson or Pasteur. Similarly, the discovery of the Tomb of Tutankhamun by 
Howard Carter was considered a successful result of his search. In legal judgments, 
though, there is no hidden truth, no secret, a judgment may ultimately be no more 
than an educated opinion and my opinion may not be shared by other judges, at 
                                                        
29 Assuming about 4 decisions a week and about 10 applications a week, adjusted for holidays. 
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whatever judicial level.30 As Posner says, ‘many of the decisions that constitute the 
output of a court system cannot be shown to be either ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ whether in 
terms of consequences or other criteria…computing an overall judicial error rate, 
correlating judicial errors with particular methods of judicial making and 
determining whether the error rate is too high (compared with what?) and would 
be lower if algorithmic decision making (with all its limitations) were substituted 
for intuitive decision making are impossible in the present state of our 
knowledge.’(Posner 2010: 3). How, then, can a body of work be evaluated? 
 
One measure would be whether my judgments had been appealed, to the Court of 
Appeal. Only one was. The Court of Appeal decided differently from me. So, I 
have a 100% failure rate in the Court of Appeal, but set against that is the fact that 
out of the thousands of appeals I decided only one went that far. This, then, is no 
entirely reliable measure, particularly when it is remembered that a losing appellant 
may not be able to afford an appeal to a higher judicial authority. Still, it is a 
measure and in broad terms shows I was doing my job right. Others, though, may 
say that the lack of challenge to my judgments to the Court of Appeal shows that 
those judgments have not been forward thinking or at the cutting edge of legal 
thought. That view, however, suggests that I decided most appeals in favour of the 
relevant Government department and that is just not the case. It could, however, be 
argued that in the absence of a judgment on a point of law of widespread 
importance the costs of an appeal to the Court of Appeal in an individual case 
would not be cost effective to that department. 
 
It is also, I suggest, legitimate in evaluating success, to look at the way people 
behaved in hearings. I was never attacked or verbally abused, no one ever stormed 
out of a hearing or waylaid me later. Given that these things have happened to 
other judges I may take some satisfaction from their absence. Also, dissatisfied 
appellants can always write in later and complain. Few have done, and I have never 
had a judicial complaint upheld against me. On the other side of the coin, however, 
very few successful appellants have written expressing gratitude.  
 
So, if ‘The quality of a judge’s performance is reflected, if only dimly, by such 
observables as backlog, reversal rate (the monitoring of which limits a judge’s 
ability to minimize his backlog by excessive haste in deciding cases), judicial                                                         
30 ‘What is involved in an appellate review is, at bottom, simply confidence or lack thereof in 
another person’s decision.’ (Posner 2010: 114). 
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demeanor, and complaints by litigants and lawyers’ (Posner 2010: 131) I suppose I 
have achieved a level of success. There is, though, no formal system of appraisal in 
the higher judiciary. Given the complexity of the jurisdiction it is not easy to see 
who could undertake any appraisal and in any event although appraisal has its uses 
I know from personal experience (as an appraiser and appraise) that there is the 
danger of ‘reactivity,’ or what Espeland and Sauder described as the propensity of 
‘individuals [to] alter their behavior in reaction to being evaluated, observed or 
measured.’ (Espeland and Sauder 2007: (113) 1-40). 
 
Apart from appealing to the Court of Appeal a dissatisfied appellant can seek 
judicial review (which costs money) or apply for a setting aside on the basis of a 
procedural error (which does not). Only a handful of judicial review applications 
were made and only one was successful, and even then because the DWP did not 
argue the case, probably on costs grounds, and most setting aside applications fail, 
because they are in reality attempts to re-argue the merits of a case. 
 
The upshot of this is that in reality there is no reliable judicial indicator of success 
– or failure. I derive some comfort from this. That is because, although no 
standards exist by which I may be considered a success, the corollary is that I 
cannot be adjudged a failure. That may be thought unsatisfactory but in my view it 
simply is a consequence of the very nature of judgment and, indeed, may be a 
strength of the system: if ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘strict’ or ‘sympathetic’ judges could 
easily be identified that could lead to judge shopping by the parties. 
 
Additionally I see the fact that judgments are in some ways matters of opinion as a 
strength of the system. That does not mean that judgments, by myself or any judge, 
are simply matters of judicial whimsy, toss of a coin or arbitrariness. Any judgment 
has to identify and explain the law and set out how and why that decision has been 
reached. The judgment, then, has to be transparent and conform to known 
standards of judicial reasoning. If it were otherwise there would be no point in, or 
need for, a judicial system since the law would be so clear that its meaning and 
application would be unarguable. No legal system in the world has ever, or could 
ever, attain that goal. Also, the possibility of a higher appeal is comforting to me: 
no judgment – of mine or any judge – can be perfect. It is always open to some 
form of criticism and in appeals in which I could have justified and written a 
decision either way (and this happens regularly) the availability of a higher 
challenge guards against judicial fallibility. 
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Fortunately, judges in the United Kingdom have tenure for life, being subject to 
removal only for serious professional or legal breaches. It happens very rarely. 
That is a comfort, since I did not have to worry about the consequences of my 
decisions on reappointment but I wonder if it also ‘invites abuse because it 
eliminates any penalty for shirking? (Posner 2010: 158). Here I part company with 
Posner. In a small jurisdiction like mine, in the Upper Tribunal, all judges know 
pretty well what their colleagues do in terms of output and quality of work, so peer 
pressure is an effective built in safeguard, obviating Posner’s doubts. 
 
The humdrum of daily work did not permit considered reflection or evaluation of 
my decision making. Stepping back from ‘the daily round, the common task’ has 
given me a new perspective. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Judicial techniques in an age of austerity 
 
 
‘There is a fundamental public duty on the Government, and also on the legal 
profession and the Judiciary to work constructively together with a view to best 
maintaining access to justice in the face of the harsh realities of Government 
finances.’ (Neuberger 2013). 
 
No one could reasonably object to that statement by Lord Neuberger31, but it begs 
the crucial question of how judges like me can reasonably adapt the judicial 
process to suit resource exigencies.  
 
One way would be to restrict the flow of work to suit the budget, by restricting 
appeal rights and making the law more prescriptive so as to reduce the possibility 
of appeals. This, though, would not work. 
 
First, the European Convention on Human Rights provides for a right to a hearing 
before an independent judicial body.  
 
Second, experience taught me that ever more prescriptive laws are like an attempt 
to remove an air bubble in wallpaper – you may shift it but not eradicate it 
altogether. That is because new legislative provisions in the general field of welfare 
benefits have proved to be a fruitful area of litigation. Not only are there inevitable                                                         
31 Neuberger, Lord  ‘Judges and Policy: A Delicate Balance’ June 2013 Speech at Institute for 
Government 
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attempts to challenge new legislation but there are usually transitional provisions, 
designed to protect those already in receipt of benefits against prejudicial effects, 
which are also usually complex and often result in litigation. 
 
It has been suggested that more use be made of summary decisions, as in Appendix 
E. However, although in some cases in the Upper Tribunal the issues are clear cut 
and simple enough to permit of a summary decision that would not be the case in 
oral hearings, which by their very nature are usually held only in cases of 
complexity, not being susceptible to summary, unreasoned, determination, see, for 
example, Appendices N and P. 
 
The procedure rules32 do however allow for a decision to be given orally, at a 
hearing, but that is rare, for the reason given above. The rules also provide that 
written reasons must be given save where the parties agree otherwise or where 
there is a consent decision. In times of case pressure the flexibility allowed by the 
rules is welcome. That has, however, to be balanced against the need for the First – 
tier tribunal, on any rehearing, to know why (if it be the case) a decision has been 
set aside and what pitfalls they must avoid. How is this tension addressed? 
 
The starting point is when permission to appeal is given. Time was when reasons 
for giving or refusing an application were often not given. Things have changed 
with the emphasis on transparency in modern administrative law. That is 
recognized by rule 22, in that reasons have to be given. In this way the parties are 
able to address those reasons in any submissions later made. Not only this but, in 
exercise of the case management powers contained in rule 5, the parties are often 
directed to say whether they agree to a decision on the basis of any potential error 
of law identified in the permission. In many cases they do agree, and this results in 
a shortened end to end decision making process. Appendix A shows what typical 
case management directions look like and Appendix B shows the fruit these 
directions bore in the form of a reasoned and helpful submission from the Secretary 
of State’s representative, facilitating an expedited decision by myself. Similarly, 
Appendix F shows how a supportive submission on behalf of the Secretary of State 
can be incorporated into a decision. This is a more convenient and user friendly use 
of a Secretary of State’s submission than directing that submission to be provided 
separately to the tribunal, as in Appendix E.                                                         
32 Rules 39 and 40, Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 
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I learned that time invested in carefully dealing with an application pays dividends. 
A quick ill considered permission means time taken later on an unmeritorious 
appeal. Longer time taken at an early stage on a meritorious application means 
shorter time for dealing with the later substantive appeal.  
 
In addition, the interventionist (inquisitorial) role of the Upper Tribunal means that 
a judge is often able to suggest appropriate case disposal solutions. 
 
There seems an increasing tendency to look to dispute resolution methods outside 
court or tribunal procedures. As a one time Industrial Tribunal judge I know the 
benefits of ACAS33. ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) is a form of problem 
solving and, as such, not amenable for use in the Upper Tribunal. Many appeals to 
the Upper Tribunal arise because of uncertainties in the proper interpretation and 
application of the law. Such cases require an authoritative statement by the Upper 
Tribunal on what the law is and how it should be applied.  
 
In my experience, attitudes of appellants in citizen v citizen disputes were very 
different from those in citizen v state disputes. In the latter attitudes tend to become 
entrenched at an early stage, and many appellants want their day in court – and 
have an unshaken conviction in the merits of their case. 
 
The government has made it clear that the courts should be self - funding. Those 
making an application have to pay for it. At present there are no fees prescribed in 
welfare benefits appeals. A small fee would effectively act as a measure of good 
faith and might tend to discourage unmeritorious applications. Set against that, 
however, those on benefits – or seeking them – usually lack financial resources and 
a fee might just as easily discourage a genuine claimant as a non genuine one. 
Additionally, any fee regime would need to provide for fee exemption or 
remission, the former, for example, in cases of legally aided claimants, the latter if 
they win their appeals. This would interpose an additional layer of administration 
and judicial resource, and so increase costs.  
 
Apart from this there is no room for a negotiated settlement by the time an appeal 
reaches the Upper Tribunal. By definition, by then there will already have been a                                                         
33 The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
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winner and a loser at First – tier level. The parties in the course of an appeal before 
the Upper Tribunal might reasonably be thought to wish to take account of, and 
respect, the views of the higher judicial authority, especially when those views 
might reflect the way in which the appeal might be decided. Often, in my 
experience, the parties were only too grateful for a judicial “steer”:(as in Appendix 
C) the relevant government department’s representative usually welcomed the 
opportunity to close a case without further time and trouble and the appellant (if an 
individual) often preferred a quick end to achieve closure. 
 
Is there, though, any inherent danger in the Upper Tribunal suggesting a decision to 
the parties? Could such a technique relieve the judge of making a time consuming, 
lengthy and complex decision, possibly exposing him to the risk of an appeal? Is 
there also the danger that it might be thought that the judge, in expressing a view, 
has pre judged the issue, with the result that any subsequent decision might be 
tainted by some form of bias or other breach of natural justice? In my experience, 
the answer to this is ‘No’. Why? 
 
First, I learned by cautious experience that one had to pick a case that might 
reasonably be susceptible to some form of agreed decision. For example, if the 
parties are agreed that an error of law exists that alone forms a good starting point, 
with only the remedy remaining. There would be no point in suggesting a decision 
if the parties are combative and determined on their day in court. 
 
Second, the way in which a decision is proposed, or even mooted, is vital. The 
phraseology has to be such that it is transparent that no firm view has been 
expressed or final conclusion reached.  
 
Third, the reasons for a proposed decision have clearly to be spelled out, so that the 
parties are aware of my thinking and are in an informed position to assess what 
they might gain by an agreement, balanced against the risks of litigation. 
 
Fourth, if either party objected to a suggestion or to my continued involvement in 
the appeal I could have recused myself. 
 
Fifth, it may be apparent from the tenor of representations that both sides are 
amenable to an agreed decision. This makes it important for the case to be dealt 
with throughout by the same judge (absent any compelling reason to the contrary) 
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so that he maintains some continuity of thought as the case progresses and is alive 
to the attitudes of the parties and the manner in which they conduct their case. 
 
‘There is a tendency for an appellate judge to lose touch with aspects of the world 
of legal advice and litigation,’(Neuberger 2013) says the President of the Supreme 
Court. It seemed to me that, when I became an Upper Tribunal judge, I would need 
to somehow anchor myself in order to avoid the heady air and judicial altitude 
sickness of the ivory tower. This, I acknowledge, is not a discrete judicial tool but I 
found the solution I adopted served me well: I sit as a part time immigration judge, 
at First-tier level. 
 
New laws present new problems. The development of human rights principles is 
fraught with difficulty for judges. That the Human Rights Act would cause 
problems for judges was seen by at least one senior judge, Lord McCluskey, who  
wrote that the legislation would ‘…provide a field day for crackpots, a pain in the 
neck for judges and a gold mine for lawyers.  (McCluskey 2000). See Appendix P 
as an illustration of the complexities of human rights issues. 
 
What did all this mean for me, as a judge? 
 
First, human rights imposed a further layer of judicial consideration of the merits 
of a case. In an adversarial system the judge can usually safely focus only upon 
issues raised by the parties. Not so in an inquisitorial system, because of its very 
nature.  
 
This, in turn, leads to a second problem, how to identify and raise human rights 
issues, and ensure they are properly addressed.  
 
A third problem is that of time, since each appeal carries on its coat tails a potential 
human rights issue, meaning it takes longer to consider and determine than would 
otherwise be the case. 
 
I developed tactical devices and strategies to address human rights issues; some 
were designed to save time and ensure that cases were dealt with expeditiously, but 
never at the expense of justice, and some designed to ensure full participation in 
the appellate process. Both factors are in effect part of the “mission statement’ 
enshrined in the Upper Tribunal Procedure rules: 
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I maintained a mental ‘tick box’ in every case to ensure that, even if not expressly 
raised, I had considered human rights aspects, even if I concluded that none arose. 
 
If in doubt I issued case management directions, either seeking further details from 
the party raising the issue or requiring the views of the respondent on any issue 
raised.  
 
 
I increasingly took the views of the registrars of the Upper Tribunal, legally 
qualified civil servants who have some delegated judicial and administrative 
functions. Some have particular areas of expertise. They were often able to analyse 
and distil human rights (and other) points. That saved me time and has the 
advantage of making the registrars feel a valued part of the appellate process, as 
indeed they are. Even if I did not accept their advice it acted as a sounding board 
and platform for future action. 
 
As in every appeal, I was able to discuss live issues and problems with other 
judicial colleagues. Whilst the final decision remained mine a distillation of 
comments and advice from colleagues is very often useful. 
 
There is never likely to come a time of fruitful judicial resources, despite the 
burgeoning tide of appeals. The trick is to balance the need for expeditious case 
disposal against the interests of justice. Some of the above tactical measures may 
help in that aim. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Pleasures and Problems in Judging 
 
 
Being a judge is a privilege. Set against that, however, the Upper Tribunal tends to 
be seen as an ivory tower, removed from the reality of the real world of tribunal 
justice and one needs to guard against lofty detachment from the realities of the 
administration of justice, the problems faced by decision makers and those of 
individual claimants. 
 
I recall, for example, an experienced tribunal judge commenting that he would like 
the salary of a Social Security Commissioner and be able to live their apparently 
relaxed and remote lifestyle, untroubled by difficult claimants, the pressure of 
dealing with a list of cases and impenetrable decisions under appeal. I was that 
judge. I see things differently now, having seen the strengths and weaknesses of 
both appellate levels. Not all judges in my chamber had previous First – tier 
experience but some have. In my view this is good: amongst other things, it 
demonstrates to those in the First – tier that I and others like me were not armchair 
generals, with no experience in the field. 
 
These shadows of tribunals past did not alter my view of the law and the ultimate 
question of whether the tribunal erred in law but, whilst my judgment was 
unaffected, my style of expression was not. I was writing a judgment for an 
audience – the parties – and one consequence of this is that the writing style had to 
be accessible, transparent and free from archaic language. This was not easy, since 
we all have means of expression which we use easily so as to become second 
nature to us but which may be lost on others. 
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Over a period of time I developed a number of strategies to address the above 
problems.  
 
When new I wrote draft judgments by hand. That was time consuming. After I had 
been in post for a while greater confidence, and time pressures, led me to dictate, 
but always in draft. The delay between dictation and the return of the transcript 
gave a breathing space, which meant I came afresh to the case. The volume of 
work was such that it was difficult to remember a case even after only a few days. 
 
Often I showed the draft to a colleague for comment, and obtained comments from 
a registrar. There are a number of deputy judges of the Upper Tribunal and some of 
these are salaried First –tier tribunal judges. Regular and frequent contact with 
them kept me abreast of issues and developments at First – tier level and their 
comments on draft decisions are invaluable. 
 
Parties to an appeal often comment on relevant judgments written by others. 
Sometimes those comments highlight problems of expression. 
 
Because I found it difficult to spot typing or other similar errors in my judgments I 
had them proof read by another and this often brought to light other errors. 
 
As part of my continuing education I had to read judgments of others in my 
chamber and in the wider judicial system. This exposed me to different styles of 
writing and expression and I had no qualms in adopting these, if they fit the bill. 
 
All of this, however, does not alone prevent a somewhat isolationist judicial style. 
How did I guard against this? Sitting part time as a judge in the First-tier 
Immigration and Asylum Tribunal honed my judgecraft since oral hearings in the 
Upper Tribunal are relatively few 34 , whereas most initial appeals in the 
immigration tribunal are dealt with by oral hearings. This experience also reminded 
me of what First –tier tribunals have to deal with in terms of list management, and 
fostered what I hope was an enabling, user friendly approach. Additionally there 
was a spin off because of the interface between welfare benefits and 
immigration/asylum cases. 
                                                         
34About 95% of appeals are decided without an oral hearing 
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My sitting in immigration worked for me, and it helped to refresh me by removing 
some of the tedium of an unremitting diet of Upper Tribunal work. It also provided 
a salutary reminder to me of the problems faced by First – tier tribunals and of the 
difficulties of providing, within the constraints of efficiency and justice, a 
judgment properly supported by a process of fact finding and reasoning. 
 
There is a fundamental problem, in my view, in judging in this area of law: 
Cardozo speaks of the judge being informed by the ‘…customary morality of right 
– minded men and women by which he is to enforce his decree’ and says that ‘A 
jurisprudence that is not constantly brought into relation to objective or external 
standards incurs the risk of degenerating into jurisprudence of mere sentiment or 
feeling’. (Cardozo 1921: 34).  
 
Irrespective of decision making in the particular case, though, what was the 
backdrop against which I view this area of law? It has not changed over the years. 
It has always seemed to me that in any civilized society provision would be made 
by the state for those who need help, whether by reason of, for example, ill health 
or financial hardship, the ‘need’, however, being identified by the state in the law 
to be applied, as with the ‘help.’ In general resource allocation by the Government 
of the day was not a matter for me35. Similarly, without being icily indifferent to 
the plight of those to whom the law applies, it was not for me to form a view as to 
its fairness.  
 
Many claimants relied on a generalized but nonetheless sincere resort to ‘justice’, 
as if it were some form of ‘unseen justice, independent of human agency, which we 
are straining to believe in and discover.’(Goldsmith 2013). I confess that my heart 
sank when faced with such a plea to such an undefined and almost other worldly 
notion, as experience told me that most of those resorting to such a plea were 
disappointed with the outcome. And yet that was to my mind no excuse for not 
striving to do justice, even though it cannot be defined, explained or rationalised.  
 
However one conceives ‘Justice’ it is manifestly important, not as a conceptual 
philosophical ideal but as a working principle, since ‘Without justice there is no 
rule of law’ and because ‘…it is so fundamental to our lives, every citizen should 
                                                        
35 It may, though, be a consideration that can properly be reflected in issues of discrimination and 
human rights 
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be concerned with the rule of law’ it follows that every citizen, and certainly those 
who hold judicial office, should be concerned with justice. (Neuberger 2013). 
 
The power to innovate in an area of law heavily circumscribed by detailed 
legislative provisions is very limited. Was I, though, ever tempted to be ‘generous’ 
in a ‘deserving’ case, which would otherwise fail, to allow an appeal? No, never. 
Why? There are several reasons: 
 
It was not what I was paid to do. It would have been unprofessional. Judges like 
me only took the judicial oath36 after the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 
2007, but that only confirmed the position, it did not bring it into being. 
 
What I thought might have been the ‘right’ thing to do might not have been correct. 
Subjectivity is dangerous in this regard. 
 
Whilst the successful claimant in a case that ought, on a correct application of the 
law, to fail may be delighted, initially, that delight might soon turn to despair (not 
to mention inconvenience and cost) if the other party launched an appeal, which 
they might very well do if I twisted the law. 
 
Even if the losing party did not appeal my decision that decision would be unfair to 
others in the system, who might not be faced with a judge or decision maker 
willing to bend the rules. 
 
It would set a bad precedent and lead others astray. It would also bring discredit 
upon the Upper Tribunal and diminish its standing, to the detriment of its place in 
the machinery of justice. 
 
In a democratic society Parliament, (unlike judges, accountable to the electorate) is 
charged with the task of law making.  
 
It was still satisfying when I felt able to rectify an injustice. It was not always easy 
to evaluate this: In the formal court structure judgment has, ex hypothesi, to be                                                         
36 ‘I, …… , do swear by Almighty God that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady Queen 
Elizabeth the Second in the office of Judge of the Upper Tribunal , and I will do right to all 
manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm, without fear or favour, affection or ill 
will.’ 
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given for one party or the other. Thus, ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ can be identified. In 
my appellate jurisdiction, however, it was only infrequently that a final decision 
could be given on the merits of the underlying appeal. If, say, a claimant loses 
before the First – tier Tribunal it may be that the decision of that tribunal is found 
to be erroneous in law, to use the statutory language. Under s12(1)(b) of the 2007 
Act37 in such a case the Upper Tribunal must either send back (‘remit’) the case to 
the First - tier Tribunal for rehearing or ‘re – make’ the decision of the tribunal.38 It 
is only in the latter contingency that the substantive appeal will be determined. If 
the decision of the tribunal is erroneous for lack of fact finding, for example, I 
would not have been in a position to substitute my own findings. That is because 
the First –tier Tribunal often has the benefit of ‘wing’ members whose specialized 
knowledge and experience are invaluable, quite apart from the fact that a fresh 
tribunal would have the benefit of seeing and hearing the claimant, so as to be 
better able to evaluate his or her evidence. Such an appeal is illustrated by 
Appendix F. 
 
In some cases, however, I was able to decide matters by my own decision on the 
merits, as exemplified in Appendices G and H. I increasingly sought to do this. It 
served no useful purpose to send back a manifestly hopeless case. Resources of all 
kinds are in increasingly short supply. Similarly it might have been that the 
Secretary of State’s representative would not only support the appeal before me but 
would also suggest whether, and if so to what effect, I should substitute my own 
decision. I could have suggested in case management directions that the Secretary 
of State’s representative should address any strange or unusual adjudication history 
and I might have commented on the strength of the evidence, perhaps suggestive of 
an award. This reflected my greater use of the interventionist approach which is 
brought into being by case management directions. It is also, I suggest, an 
approach which comes with increasing confidence and experience, and an 
awareness of how the other party to the appeal may react. 
 
In the type of case referred to above ‘closing the book’ on an appeal is not only 
satisfying but an effective use of resources.  
 
One of the qualities expected of a judge is authority, the ability to control 
proceedings effectively, whilst ensuring full participation by the parties without                                                         
37 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
38 This happens in no more than about 25% of cases 
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being authoritarian. It is not too difficult to avoid pomposity. Sometimes, however, 
the relatively informal nature of hearings in the Upper Tribunal may be taken by 
users as a signal for familiarity, an anything goes system in which users are free to 
say and do what they like. This in no small part stems from a change in attitude 
towards judges by court/tribunal users as a whole. We live in a society in which 
authority is regularly challenged and a rights based culture encourages this. In itself 
this may be thought to be a sign of a healthy democracy. Set against that, however, 
the fact that people in general are more challenging of and less deferential to 
people, like judges, in ‘authority’ has implications: it may induce a lack of 
willingness to participate in the appellate process, it may result in unnecessary 
appeals, it may lead to obstructive and awkward behaviour in court, which may be 
difficult to control, it may result in protracted correspondence after an unsuccessful 
appeal and it may obscure good points in an appeal. All of this needs to be avoided, 
or addressed if it arises. How did I go about this? 
 
Training and experience taught me a number of strategic and tactical devices to 
ensure that the parties were best able to present the case and so that I am best able 
to do my job. 
 
A good starting point in oral hearings was always to explain to the unrepresented  
what my job was, how I went about it and that I was independent of the tribunal 
below and of the body whose initial decision was appealed. This proved to be a 
useful scene setting procedure, and gave a possibly nervous appellant a chance to 
settle down.  
 
It usually avoided any antagonism by the appellant to any government 
representative if I explained that he or she was not the person who made the 
decision under appeal, and that it was (in that jurisdiction) not the job of that 
representative to act as prosecutor, or to seek to have the appeal dismissed. 
 
In order to ensure that ‘…justice should not only be done but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done’ (Hewart 1924: 246) I always found that unfailing 
courtesy and patience, even or especially in the face of obstructive and 
uncooperative appellants, were rewarded in a smooth hearing. Similarly, being 
continually alert to possible misunderstandings, confusion or lack of clarity by 
either party facilitates a proper hearing, as does intervention to ensure technical 
legal points are understood by the appellant.  
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It was tempting to deal quickly with an application for permission, to get it off the 
desk.  That short term expedient came home to roost later, possibly in the form of a 
time consuming and unmeritorious appeal. A simple ‘Permission to appeal is 
granted’ leaves much work to be done later. I learned that time invested in the 
application stage saves more time later. In Appendix C case management 
directions39 were given, to facilitate expeditious disposal of the ensuing appeal. 
This is a technique I used increasingly. I learned that simply to give ‘open ended’ 
permission to appeal lacked focus and often resulted in submissions from the 
parties, which did not address relevant matters.  Giving detailed reasons required a 
greater investment of time at the initial stage but paid off, in most cases, by putting 
matters ‘in the frame’ so as to enable the parties to focus on issues that concerned 
me. In this way I came to appreciate that the end to end decision making process 
was significantly shortened. 
 
Getting the parties to do their bit also saved precious time. That only came with the 
confidence born of experience and an awareness of the extent of my powers. If I 
was not sure about the merits of an application I asked for the views of the other 
party. See Appendix A and what that resulted in in Appendix B. Often, as in this 
case, an otherwise lengthy and time consuming process (for me, at any rate) was 
obviated. 
 
Contrast also the quick and easy procedure for a setting aside by consent, 
Appendix E, (which obviates the need for a detailed critique of the tribunal’s 
decision but leaving the next tribunal wondering how to proceed) with the more 
satisfying and substantive procedure reflected in Appendix F. In appropriate cases, 
like F, I directed the submission provided on behalf of the Secretary of State to be 
before the next tribunal, as some indication of where the first tribunal went wrong 
and what not to do. 
 
Morale is important in any sphere of work. Judges are no exception. We can all ‘go 
the extra mile’ as and when we feel moved so to do. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that poor morale is endemic throughout the judiciary, especially at levels below the 
high court. There is a particular problem in relation to tribunals judiciary. They – 
we – are often perceived as the poor judicial relation of the judicial system, inferior                                                         
39 Legally binding written instructions to the parties to an appeal 
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in some way to those in the uniformed branch. No less a figure than the Deputy 
President of the Supreme Court, in a speech on judicial equality and diversity, said 
that ‘The judiciary are divided into four: the ‘officers’, the High Court and above, 
the ‘non-commissioned officers’, the Circuit Bench and some equivalents, and the 
‘other ranks’, the district judges and their equivalents and the ‘unranked’, the 
salaried tribunal judges.’ (Hale 2013).40 So, the view from the very top, and from 
one who has been involved in many appeals emanating from tribunals, is that 
tribunal judges are a class apart from their colleagues in the uniformed branch.  
 
Feeling undervalued does not affect the way tribunal judges work or their 
professionalism.. The way in which I and other tribunal judges were regarded by 
the Powers That Be does, however, have great significance. That is because of the 
perception of those Powers of what we do and our status impacts upon what is 
expected of us. For example, case loads for tribunals are set by negotiations 
between the Presidents of each jurisdiction and senior civil servants. It is, I suggest, 
a natural corollary of a false perception of our place in the judicial system and the 
complexity of the work we do that tribunal judges are faced with hearings lists that 
would not be tolerated elsewhere, in the uniformed branch. In ‘Judging Civil 
Justice’ (Genn 2009: 176) Professor Dame Hazel Genn QC quotes a QC as saying 
that district judges grapple with issues that would be worthy of three days of 
argument in the High Court Chancery Division. (Appendix I exemplifies the 
breadth and depth of issues involved, appeals like this being of greater complexity 
than run of the mill Crown or County Court cases). The same is true in the tribunal 
world. A typical session’s case list (a session being a half day) in the First-tier 
Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) would consist of three disability allowance 
appeals, with ‘float’ cases as back ups in case of non attendance.  
 
Although members of the judiciary are independent office holders, the justice 
system as a whole is administered by the Executive (the Government). Ministers 
have the benefit of advice from civil servants in relation to, for example, changes 
in the machinery of justice and the impact of proposed new legislation. There is, 
however, no continuum of knowledge in the civil servants in the Ministry of 
Justice, because civil servants regularly and frequently change jobs. In 
consequence, there is no lasting fund of knowledge. Ultimately, of course, policy                                                         
40 Lady Hale also clearly wishes to see more women judges and, indeed, it may be the logical 
consequence of her oft repeated views that there should be positive discrimination in favour of 
women in judicial appointments. That sets an entirely new hare running. 
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and its implementation is entirely a matter for ministers and the Government of the 
day. One of the functions of the civil service, however, is to provide advice and 
suggestions to ministers. A continuing body of knowledge within the civil service 
might well, I suggest, result in better informed advice and implementation. 
 
‘In Anglo – Saxon countries, the judge …is not, at least primarily, an inquisitor, 
and the system is called adversarial.’ So wrote Lord Hailsham, in ‘On The 
Constitution.’(Hailsham 1992:56). Not so in the tribunal jurisdiction. The judge 
here cannot rely on the parties or their representatives (if any) to correctly identify 
the relevant law or the probative value of the evidence. The judge in the 
inquisitorial tribunal jurisdiction has, arguably, to know more about the law and its 
application, and be better prepared for the hearing, than either of the parties or their 
representatives. He or she cannot just sit back listening to the evidence and 
arguments and say which are preferred. This judge has to be proactive, raising 
relevant issues not addressed by either side and cannot rely on the representatives 
to draw relevant matters to his or her attention.  
 
The problems are ever changing but the essential pleasures tend to remain constant.  
Sometimes addressing the challenges arising from the problems is itself a new 
source of satisfaction. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Access to Justice – a serious and continuing problem and how to address it 
 
 
‘Access to justice is the constitutional right of every citizen.’(Ministry of Justice 
2013).  
  
 
Does Justice Matter? 
 
 
Most people would say yes. If people do not have access to, or fail to obtain, 
‘justice’, they may feel aggrieved and perhaps bitter. Many appellants applying to 
the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal from the First-tier level make such 
comments. ‘Justice’ is the yardstick by which society measures and reacts to the 
law. Professor Dame Hazel Genn QC explains that it is important because the 
‘…machinery of civil justice sustains social stability and economic growth…by 
protecting private and personal rights…’ (Genn 2008: 143). 
 
If it is a given that ‘the phrase itself, ’access to justice’, is a profound and powerful 
expression of a social need which is imperative, urgent and more widespread than 
is generally acknowledged’ (Jacob 1987:4) it must reasonably follow that 
consequences will ensue from lack of access to justice, even though, as Genn says, 
‘The social benefit of the civil justice system is difficult to quantify in terms 
comprehensible to the Treasury.’ (Genn 2008: 47). 
 
I suggest that access to ‘justice’, however conceived, is important for a number of 
reasons: First, justice is effectively synonymous with the rule of law, itself a 
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hallmark of a civilized society. Second, citizens, especially the most 
underprivileged and vulnerable, should have effective access to the courts or 
tribunals to protect and enforce their fundamental rights. Third, a stable society 
needs effective justice. If ‘the right of ultimate recourse to the courts … is 
necessary for the health and harmonious functioning of a civilized society’ 
(Thomas 2005: 42) it follows that lack of that recourse will affect society. 
 
Access to justice is very important, not just to the individual but to society as a 
whole, as underpinning social order and stability. So how does this relate to 
welfare appeals? 
 
Changes in access to justice 
 
The Legal Services Commission has announced its intention to end all community 
legal advice and network contracts, so affecting advice centres, designed to offer a 
one stop shop for people with social welfare and family legal problems. Such 
centres existed throughout the country, 41 mainly in areas of social deprivation. 
Many people used them and centres like them,42 since many solicitors have no 
specialist welfare rights experience and advice agencies like these are invaluable in 
helping their clients to understand the issue, what the decision from the DWP 
means in real terms and whether to pursue an appeal. Many claimants are 
represented by experienced welfare rights advisors at tribunals. This greatly assists 
the tribunal in identifying the issues43 and in the obtaining and presentation of 
evidence,44 all of which ensures effective use of time in a busy day. Litigants in 
person have always been common in my jurisdiction, to a much greater extent than 
in the courts. This imposes an additional strain. As was said by the Judges’ Council 
(chaired by the Lord Chief Justice) in responding to the proposed cuts in legal aid: 
‘The proposals would lead to a huge increase in the incidence of unrepresented 
litigants, with serious implications for the quality of justice…at a time when courts 
                                                        
41 Manchester, Gateshead, Leicester, Derby, Hull, East Riding of Yorkshire, West Sussex, 
Wakefield and Barking and Dagenham for example 
42 For example local authority welfare rights organisations, Citizens Advice Bureaux and the like 
43 For example, in disability living allowance cases by making clear which component at which 
rate of benefit is argued for 
44‘… judges like me are spending more and more of our time having to deal with litigants who 
simply do not know the law, have never heard of the Civil Procedure Rules…and have breached 
most of the case management directions.’ District Judge R Chapman, President of the Association 
of HM District Judges, quoted in Law Society Gazette, 10 May 2012. Whilst his comment is made 
in relation to court proceedings it is equally apposite to tribunal proceedings. 
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are having to cope in any event with closures, budgetary cut – backs and 
reductions in staff numbers.’(Judges’ Council 2011). 
 
The guiding principle ought to be that ‘No matter how good tribunals may be, they 
do not fulfill their function unless they are accessible by the people who want to 
use them, and unless the users receive the help they need to prepare and present 
their cases.’ (Leggatt 2001: foreword) 
 
Lord Carnwath recognizes problems in his comment that ‘Ministry of Justice 
ministers and senior officials are beginning to get used to my constant refrain to 
‘think tribunals’ whenever court or justice reform is on the agenda. If anything 
perhaps the danger is they may be too ready to see tribunals as a cheap and 
cheerful answer for all the problems of access to justice in cold times. That would 
be a fundamental mistake. Courts and tribunals are distinctive, complementary and 
essential parts of an effective justice system’ (Carnwath 2010). 
 
Lord Carnwath, as (then) senior President of Tribunals was the country’s most 
senior judge in the field of tribunals. As such he ought reasonably to have known 
about the value – added nature of the work undertaken by voluntary agencies, and 
what might result from its absence. He put it like this: ‘I am very concerned as to 
the consequences of turning off the majority of civil legal aid, including 
particularly legal help, without plans for the development of alternatives. For 
example, Citizens Advice Bureaux play an essential role in explaining benefit 
decisions, helping appellants decide whether to appeal, and helping them to 
prepare. Without these actions the work of the tribunals may increase rather than 
decrease – both in terms of the numbers of cases and the length of hearings.’ 
(Carnwath 2010). 
 
 By the time the true cost has emerged it may be difficult if not impossible to 
remedy the defect. Similarly, although many lawyers offer pro bono services it 
should be borne in mind that ‘…The expectation that pro bono, one of the more 
impressive parts of the ‘Big Society’, can pick up where £300m of civil legal aid 
cuts left off is fanciful.’(Law Society Gazette 2013). 
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This problem looks set to worsen in future: In what has been described by one 
former Lord Chancellor45 as a ‘Delphic’ statement the current Lord Chancellor46 
has said he wants to ‘…ensure that those who litigate in our courts pay their fair 
share, and that it is possible to raise the revenue and investment necessary to 
modernize the infrastructure and deliver a better and more flexible service to court 
users’. (Grayling 2013). It may be wishful thinking to suppose that in his reference 
to ‘courts’ the Lord Chancellor had in mind formal courts, as opposed to tribunals. 
Fees have, for example, been introduced in immigration appeals, dealt with in the 
tribunal system47. 
 
That proper advice and representation is a ‘good thing’ is demonstrated by some 
statistics: The Disability Law Service, a registered charity which provides free 
legal advice and representation to disabled people, says that the success rates at 
tribunals where neither the claimant nor representative attend is about 20%, 51% 
where only the claimant attends and rising to 66% where both attend. These figure 
relate to First – tier tribunals but they have a knock on effect on appeals before the 
Upper Tribunal in that unsuccessful First –tier claimants may be spurred to 
challenge the decision on appeal. Since an appeal to the Upper Tribunal lies only 
on a point of law48 the problems manifested before the First – tier tribunal are all 
the more to the fore before the Upper Tribunal. 
 
The difficulties caused by lack of representation are getting worse. This is because 
of the increasing complexities of the legislative provisions and the regularity and 
frequency of change49. ‘There’s a lot of talk about pro bono and volunteers, but it 
must be understood that volunteers cannot replace the services provided for 
casework and specialist advice’ (Law Society Gazette 2013) so said the Chief 
Executive of a well respected advice agency, the Free Representation Unit. 
 
What impact did all this have on my work? The answer is a serious one:                                                          
45 Falconer Lord C, 16 May 2013, The Times 
46 Rt Hon Chris Grayling MP, written statement. The rest of this statement was considered by 
many judges to be indicative of impending privatization of court resources, given the unusually 
high number of adverse judicial comments on the Ministry of Justice Judicial Intranet, a sort of 
judicial chatroom 
47 The  fee in an oral immigration appeal is £140, a sum which, it is suggested, would be entirely 
beyond the means of many on benefits 
48 Section 11(1) Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
49A commissioner in CP/5257/99 described one legislative provision as ‘a masterpiece of 
obscurity’ and the Court of Appeal (not noted for overstatement) in Concannon v Secretary of 
State for Social Security spoke of some provisions as being of ‘monumental complexity.’ 
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First, unsuccessful claimants are more likely to appeal. Proper representation at an 
early stage could enable more people to succeed, obviating any need for a further 
appeal and with a consequent saving of time and money. Even a losing claimant, 
however, would benefit from advice before embarking on an appeal. Not all cases 
are worth pursuing and even if they are, properly focused grounds of appeal, and 
marshalled arguments in support, made it easier for me to do my job and ensure 
that the interests of justice are served. 
 
Second, the Upper Tribunal has to deal with cases ‘fairly and justly’. This ‘mission 
statement’ is to be found in the Upper Tribunal Rules50, and was not present in 
their predecessor. Nonetheless, it does no more than encapsulate in form what all 
courts and tribunals must surely have always striven for. This rule mirrors its 
counterpart in the First-tier Tribunal Rules51 and is identical to a rule found in 
another major tribunal jurisdiction52. It is however difficult to achieve when one 
party is at a disadvantage in lacking knowledge of the law and tribunal procedure, 
which might otherwise be made good by representation. 
 
Third, perception is a significant factor. That is because claimants, whether 
successful or not, like to feel that they have had a fair deal from the judge (if not 
from the legislation he or she applies) and it is important that no – one goes away 
from a hearing with a sense of grievance. That is part and parcel of the 
administration of justice. That means, in turn, that unrepresented claimants may 
well need longer to explain and develop their case. This may mean that an oral 
hearing is longer than it ought to be or, in cases dealt with by papers alone, it may 
necessitate more frequent and detailed case management directions53 to ensure that 
the relevant issues are teased out and properly addressed. 
 
Fourth, cases with unrepresented claimants often take longer to determine than 
those with the benefit of representation. This has implications in the effective use 
of resources, both judicial and administrative, not only for the particular claimant 
but for others in the system. This is compounded by budgetary restraints in the age                                                         
 50 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, rule 2(1), under the heading “Overriding 
Objective.” 
51 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008, rule2(1) 
52 Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 
2014  
53 The Upper Tribunal is empowered to issue case management directions by rule 5 of the 
Procedure Rules 2008 
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of austerity. These usually mean that fewer administrative staff have to do the same 
amount of work as before. It may also mean restrictions on the numbers of Deputy 
(ie part time, remunerated on a daily fee basis) Upper Tribunal judges, and the 
frequency with which they sit. 
 
Fifth, an extra judicial layer is imposed, in addition to the essential task of 
identifying the relevant law, interpreting and applying it, which alone is 
demanding. This is because in my jurisdiction I cannot be confident that the 
interests of the parties will be looked after by their representatives, because there 
often are none. Even in represented cases lawyers are rare. Some welfare rights 
workers are very experienced and are competent but other volunteers, from a 
variety of agencies, not only lack legal knowledge but have only a hazy 
understanding of the tribunal system and the law, which adversely affects the 
conduct of the case. As is recognized by the Judicial Working Group on Litigants 
in Person, over recent years many people are represented by lay advocates, with no 
training or qualification in the law, who act on payment of a fee (as distinct from 
voluntary representation by advice agency workers). Some are competent and 
responsible, others not. Since they are not professionally qualified they owe no 
duty to the tribunal and sometimes behave in a manner that would not be tolerated 
or expected of a qualified representative. My job was to be ever vigilant, at all 
stages in the proceedings, to ensure these problems are minimized. 
 
 In responding to an academic research project a circuit judge said that ‘If you are 
an advocate you have lived with the case…you are in command of it…but as a 
judge you come to it much colder…’(Darbyshire 2011: 79). Therein lies the 
essential difference between the adversarial and the inquisitorial procedure. In 
contrast to proceedings in the formal courts I, like other judges in the inquisitorial 
system, could not be assured that a case will be properly presented. That means 
that I, unlike a circuit judge, could not just sit back and listen to argument. To do 
my job properly I had to be in command of the case as least as well as any 
advocate would be. In another response to Darbyshire one chancery judge was 
shocked by cases where he was the only lawyer in court. That was, for me, 
commonplace.  
 
Sixth, I could not tell beforehand what is the extent of a litigant in person’s 
readiness, procedural and legal knowledge, confidence and aptitude for the 
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proceedings. These are largely unknown factors and so contingency planning is 
problematic. 
 
Seventh, litigants in person are more likely to lodge misconceived applications and 
appeals and are more prone to making judicial complaints when, in reality, what 
they are really complaining about is the fact that they have lost their appeal. All 
this makes for a sense of unease and apprehension on my part. 
 
Eighth, a case involving a litigant in person may require more proactive handling 
than one with representatives, in the form of case management directions, 
preliminary hearings to identify the issues and logistical matters, for example, and 
these factors impact on the time taken to determine that appeal, as well as on other 
appeals in the system, waiting longer to be heard. These factors are compounded if 
English is not the litigant’s first language.54 
 
Ninth, the relative scarcity of good advice means that those whose claims have 
little prospect of success are not dissuaded from pursuing bad cases, those whose 
grievances are more properly directed elsewhere (eg to ombudsmen) cannot be 
steered accordingly and those with meritorious claims lack an experienced voice to 
assist in the resolution of the dispute before litigation. All this increases the volume 
of work. 
 
Given, then, that lack of representation causes problems – for the parties and 
myself, as a judge, how did I learn to mitigate it? There are a number of ways 
 
First, tribunal proceedings (both at First-tier and Upper level) are inquisitorial55. 
The tribunal has an interventionist role. In other words an enabling role, designed 
to pick out salient issues, ensure the parties are aware of and address them and 
thereby spot points that may be of key relevance but previously overlooked. This is 
accomplished by not simply relying on the parties to set out their case but, for 
example, by oral questioning or case management directions, flagging up issues. It 
also means that the case papers have to be carefully scrutinised at all stages to                                                         
54 The Personal Support Unit, a voluntary nationwide advice and representation organization, 
estimates that 25% of its clients across England speak English as a second language. (Source: 
Access to Justice for Litigants in Person, Civil Justice Council) 
55 In contrast, proceedings in the courts are adversarial in nature, a sort of legal trial by combat in 
which the role of the judge is often restricted to ensuring fair play, assimilating the evidence and 
then ruling to whatever effect. 
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ensure the case progresses as expeditiously as possible and that relevant points are 
not lost sight of. My having had experience at First-tier tribunal level meant I was 
familiar with the inquisitorial system and comfortable with it. That said it has long 
been received wisdom that the enabling role must not translate into the judge 
descending into the arena. To do so would compromise judicial independence. 
 
Second, although no party can be forced to seek, let alone obtain, representation 
(even if otherwise available) they can at least be made aware of its existence and 
how it might benefit them. This can and should be done at an early stage, since a 
late request for an adjournment or other time extension for representation may be 
met with a refusal. The benefits of representation can be seen by the complexities 
of the issues that had to be addressed in Appendix P. Without representation the 
Appellant would have been floundering.  
 
All cases begin with permission to appeal. This is done either at First-tier or Upper 
Tribunal level. There is no appeal to the Upper Tribunal as of right.56 Permission to 
appeal when given by the Upper Tribunal is expressed in writing and with reasons, 
highlighting the issues to the parties. At this stage a few lines in the determination 
of the application for permission, alerting the unrepresented claimant to the 
possibility of representation, and where advice may be had, may be opportune. 
Even if permission is refused this is still often a good idea. It may be, for example, 
that although there is no point of law in the application, the claimant might wish to 
think about a new claim or, possibly, a claim for maladministration. Also, this may 
be seen as an example of the judge directly engaging with the claimant, as opposed 
to ruling with lofty aloofness. 
 
A consequence of the above approach may be an adjournment request to obtain 
that advice. An unintended consequence may be that an appellant, not having been 
able to find advice, may feel all the more vulnerable and exposed. That was in my 
view a risk worth the effort. Additionally it may be that an appellant, faced with 
what he or she perceives to be a ‘user friendly’ judge, may come to expect a 
similarly user orientated attitude throughout the proceedings. It may come as a 
shock if the judge is perceived to do a volte face and, perhaps, rule against the 
appellant at some stage. The answer to this problem is that at all stages I had to 
make it clear what I was doing and why, clearly and transparently, to avoid one                                                         
56 See, respectively, rule 38 of the First-tier Procedure Rules, rule 21 of the Upper Tribunal 
Procedure Rules and s11(1) Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
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party extrapolating from an enabling approach an unwarranted partiality or 
sympathy. 
 
Third, there are always two parties to an appeal, usually the unsuccessful appellant 
and the relevant Government Department. The latter has involvement throughout 
the case, unless permission to appeal is refused by the Upper Tribunal. An 
application to the Upper Tribunal is on an ex parte basis, that is to say without 
notice to the other side. That said I increasingly involved the Secretary of State’s 
representative at the application stage: If, for example, the grounds as set out by the 
appellant were unclear, or if there was a complex point of law or voluminous 
documentation (as there often was) it seemed to me to be right to get the 
representative of the Government Department to comment.  
 
Directing comment from the Government representative achieves several 
objectives: First, it is an effective time management strategy since what might 
otherwise take me a long time to get to grips with an application can be avoided by 
having the party do their bit in the appellate process. The time saved can be 
devoted to other cases. Second, the issues can be clarified and focused. This often 
saves time later, since if the application for permission is supported on behalf of 
the Secretary of State it usually makes for a speedier appeal, as the submission 
provided on the merits of the application can also serve as the submission on the 
appeal.  
 
Fourth, I had cases in which the application seemed without merit but in which I 
thought it right to obtain an explanation from the other party of the decision under 
appeal, how and why it came to be made. This often demonstrated to an appellant a 
more personalized approach in the appellate process, since the submission provided 
on behalf of the Secretary of State will usually be more case specific than the often 
generalized and anodyne submission to the First – tier Tribunal. All this may add to 
the end to end time between receipt of an application for permission and disposal 
of the appeal. There is force in the maxim ‘justice delayed is justice denied’57 but 
better delayed justice than expediency to its detriment – ‘It is of fundamental 
importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done.’(Hewart 1924: 246)                                                         
57 Whose origin is thought by some to lie in the Magna Carta – ‘The Great Charter of the Liberties 
of England’1215 – ‘To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice’ 
Clause 40 
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Fifth, there is power under the rules58 to direct an oral hearing, of an application for 
permission or a substantive appeal. This may follow a request from one or both of 
the parties, or of my own volition. It is a popular conception that court cases are 
dealt with by oral hearing. This is the image portrayed in television fiction, for 
example. The reality is very different. Many people in the tribunal jurisdiction have 
no wish to attend a hearing, and instead are content for matters to be decided ‘on 
the papers’. This is particularly the case in the jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal, 
when a party may already have had an oral hearing at First – tier level and has no 
wish to travel to London when a point of law is at issue. An oral hearing before the 
Upper Tribunal is not an opportunity to re litigate the case as heard before the first 
– tier tribunal: the focus is materially different. 
 
An oral hearing is resource heavy. It takes time to arrange and for the hearing to 
take place. For that reason experience taught me that it was a device to be used 
with care. A party wishing such a hearing will no doubt be pleased to have one but 
that may be at the expense of others in the system, who will have to wait longer for 
their appeal to be determined. 
 
There are a number of factors I came to bear in mind in oral hearing cases: First, I 
always pointed out to the parties that such a hearing would not be a re-match of the 
original appeal. Its purpose is made clear in case management directions. That way 
the parties are prepared to deal with the issues and know what is expected of them.  
 
Second, in general there is no point in such a hearing when the case can just as 
easily be decided on the papers. The only caveat is that refusing a hearing may 
leave a party with a lingering sense of injustice. The remedy lies in the explanation 
I gave in dealing with the request for an oral hearing.  
 
Third, a complicated case will probably not lend itself to determination on the 
papers, since although the parties can set out their arguments in writing such cases 
inevitably, bearing in mind the inquisitorial function, raise issues that can be better 
dealt with orally, with the ebb and flow of oral argument.   The benefits of such a 
hearing, in which lengthy and complex issues can be argued, is shown by 
Appendix N.                                                         
58 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, rule 5(3) 
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Fourth, notwithstanding that an oral hearing is not an opportunity for a losing party 
to have a hearing when they did not opt for one at First –tier level, there may be 
cases in which the interests of justice dictate a hearing. For example, it may be 
apparent from the grounds of appeal that a party is confused about the issues or has 
difficulty in expressing themselves in writing. This is increasingly common in an 
age of e-mails and texting. It often follows that in such cases that party would not 
fully grasp a written determination, no matter how user friendly in style and 
substance. It is better to take time at an oral hearing than to leave a party with a 
grievance, which may poison their view about the machinery of justice. That is all 
the more to the fore in cases involving the most vulnerable and disadvantaged in 
society. 
 
Although the Upper Tribunal is based in London cases are often heard in the 
provinces. This is desirable in that it demonstrates taking justice to the people, 
quite apart from the fact that people usually feel more comfortable on their own 
territory and are thereby better able to participate in the appellate process. 
 
What of video hearings? At face value these sound a good idea – there is no need 
for the parties to travel long distances, they have the opportunity of a real time 
hearing and the time and expense of a conventional oral hearing is avoided. Sadly, 
experience has shown video hearings are not as good as one might expect. They 
lack the human touch, as a hearing by technology distances the parties from each 
other and the judge.  
 
‘The law courts of England are open to all men, like the doors of Ritz Hotel.’59 
Yes, well, that never was and never is likely to be the case, particularly since 
austerity measures increasingly bite hard in this area and seem set to continue. 
Lateral judicial thinking can go some way towards mitigating problems arising. In 
this regard tribunal judges are better placed than their uniformed branch 
colleagues, as they are used to an enabling, inquisitorial approach, enhanced by 
some of the techniques and measures I have indicated. 
 
The mitigating measures I have referred to, however, are not a complete solution to 
modern problems of access to justice. They relieve symptoms but do not tackle the                                                         
59 Attributed to Mr Justice Darling 
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root cause. They often come at a price, for example lengthening one stage of the 
proceedings, as when the Respondent has to make a submission on the merits of an 
application, as in Appendix B. Although the end to end decision making process 
may be shortened by some of the measures I have identified increased time at one 
stage impacts adversely on statistics, since each stage of the appellate process has 
its own targets and statistical measures. So, taking longer to determine an 
application for permission, for example, would be reflected in permission statistics. 
This could add to the tension between judiciary and administrators, another factor 
arguing for a more balanced attitude by administrators to bare statistics and what 
judges do and why.  
 
At the heart of these problems seems to be a lack of awareness of, or care about 
their effect, by the Executive. There are no votes in the Rule of Law, unless, of 
course, you feel let down by the system. People may not appreciate that ‘The 
system of civil justice is of transcendent importance’ (Jacob 1986: 1) unless and 
until they are adversely and directly affected. True, access to justice is not 
synonymous with access to a court or tribunal but the only formal structure in our 
society to attain the former lies in access to the latter. 
 
All this matters because of the importance of a healthy society. If law ‘…is, in a 
fundamental sense constitutive of society...’ (Singh 2013: 8) it is a logical corollary 
that ‘we must enable legal disputes, conflicts and complaints which inevitably arise 
in society to be resolved in an orderly way according to the justice of the case, so 
as to promote harmony and peace in society, lest they fester and breed discontent 
and disturbance.’ (Jacob 1978: 417): 
 
 So, in addition to a balance sheet approach to cost saving measures there needs, I 
suggest, to be some account taken of the potential for ‘discontent and disturbance’ 
in order to form a balanced and properly informed view of the effect of those 
measures, in other words the wider costs of the reforms. Such a view is lacking at 
present, and no-one knows what the real costs are. This was written before 
gratifying endorsement of my views by the National Audit Office: ‘The Ministry 
[of Justice] did not estimate the scale of most of the wider costs of the 
reforms...because it did not have a good understanding of how people would 
respond to the changes or what costs or benefits may arise.’ (National Audit Office 
2014). 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
‘If I ruled the World…’ 
 
 
How might the problems I have spoken of be improved, without greater financial 
resources?  
 
First, codify the masses of legislation in straightforward and accessible language. 
 
A former Lord Chief Justice (Bingham 2011: 37) takes it as axiomatic that the law 
should be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, and predictable. Law that is 
publicly available but of byzantine complexity must surely be a bad thing.  
 
Legislative hyperactivity has become a permanent feature of our governance, Lord 
Neuberger says: ‘Partly because there are so many perceived problems in society, 
there is a welter of ill-conceived legislation – poor in quality and voluminous in 
quantity’. As this can lead only to an illusion of action with no real achievement 
this is ‘…not conducive to justice and...it brings the legislature, even the rule of 
law, into disrepute’(Neuberger 2013). 
 
Much of modern legislation is in the form of statutory instruments, (SIs), in the 
main in the area of welfare law drafted ‘in-house’ by civil servants and lawyers 
who work under great pressure, to very short deadlines. The quality of SI drafting 
is worlds apart from the drafting of an act. The relative ease of passing SIs, the 
relative lack of parliamentary scrutiny and their ever increasing use have the 
cumulative effect of making the law complex and difficult to understand, let alone 
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apply. If, for example, the secondary legislation the subject of dispute in Appendix 
N had been more clearly drafted, and with a comprehensive definition section, such 
an issue may never have arisen. 
 
There is just not enough time for all the welter of new legislation, primary and 
secondary, to be properly considered by those responsible for its drafting and 
enactment: Lord Neuberger correctly said that ‘We need more legislation which is 
more critically and expertly considered and which is significantly less in quantity. 
Less and better legislation will not only mean better justice, as the law will be 
clearer and simpler. Because such a change will involve fewer statutes and SIs, it 
will also reduce costs – an important factor in an age of austerity.’(Neuberger 
2013). 
 
  As a corollary of reduced direct costs in producing legislation there would be a 
saving in indirect terms, since better legislation means less change, itself 
expensive. 
 
Second, make better use of administrative resources 
 
The tribunal process is ‘…inquisitorial rather than adversarial…a co-operative 
process of investigation in which both the claimant and the department play their 
part’(Hale 2004). See Appendices A, B and F as examples of the collaborative 
approach facilitated by case management. 
 
One solution would be to make tribunals less paper dependent, by substituting 
electronic forms of communication. The tribunal system is heavily paper 
dependent, with typically a bundle of 80 or more pages at first tier level, copied to 
all involved then copied again for the Upper Tribunal together with all the 
documents relating to the appeal to the Upper Tribunal, a cumbersome and 
expensive total of hundreds of pages.  More needs to be done to develop effective 
on-line systems which would minimize the need for expensive office space for 
judges, as much work could be home based. 
 
Video hearings (despite their failings) could be used more frequently, too. These 
can result in savings, as the travelling costs of the claimant (borne by public funds) 
are reduced and, in theory, such hearings would not need formal court or tribunal 
premises. There is a price to be paid for such hearings, though: the technology and 
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cyber time have to be paid for and the lack of personal contact and the (albeit 
short) gap between speech transmission and reception, in my experience60, make it 
difficult fully to evaluate oral evidence. In the Upper Tribunal, however, in most 
cases there is no need for evidence to be taken.  
 
Experience has shown me that short - term budgetary savings carry a hidden but 
nonetheless real cost, by, for example, a lack of presenting officers at tribunals. In 
contrast to First – tier hearings in the majority of appeal hearings before the Upper 
Tribunal the DWP (or other appropriate respondent) is represented. This, I suggest, 
is to place the balance of the decision making process at the wrong end. The 
tendency seems to be to regard the various stages of the appellate procedure as 
discrete, without considering the totality of end - to - end decision making and 
appeals. If better quality decisions were made by decision makers there would be 
fewer appeals.  
 
Likewise, if better quality decisions were made by First-tier Tribunals there would 
be fewer onward appeals to the Upper Tribunal. This was recognized by The White 
Paper “Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals”.61 The 
adequacy of the entire decision making and appellate process has to be viewed in 
totality. There are different players in the system – departmental decision makers, 
tribunals at First and Upper Tier levels, then the Court of Appeal, the Supreme 
Court and the European Court of Justice as well as the European Court of Human 
Rights.  As the Senior President observed ‘No doubt each of these actors has an 
important role, but most of them are symbols of failure. And the higher up you get 
the greater the failure. The ideal play has only one act – the original 
decision.’(Carnwath 2006). 
 
A better quality of decision, with appropriate time taken, at lower stages would in 
many cases obviate the need for onward appeals. If First-tier Tribunals were not 
under such time pressure I suggest their decisions would be more sustainable on 
scrutiny by higher judicial authorities and may even result in fewer onward 
appeals. In contrast, an appeal before the Upper Tribunal has no discrete time 
constraints. The decision in Appendix K would have taken me several hours, quite 
                                                        
60 I have conducted video hearings in the Upper Tribunal and, sitting as an immigration judge, 
have conducted case management conferences and bail hearings by this means. 
61 July 2004 Cmnd 6243 HMSO 
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possibly a day, to write. The tribunal in that case would have had probably no more 
than 40 minutes allocated for the appeal. 
 
So, better quality decisions at lower level would, I suggest, save time and money 
by reducing the need for an appeal in an individual case. True, the “unit cost” of 
each decision, whether by government decision maker or tribunal, would be higher 
but there would be an overall saving in the adjudication budget, if viewed as a 
coherent whole.  
 
Key to better quality initial decision would be some form of review procedure, to 
ensure the decision is sustainable and defensible. The difficulty at present is that, in 
a civil service world ruled by statistics, performance indicators inhibit thorough 
consideration of a claim, at both the initial and review stage. Although such 
indicators may be a useful management tool they should be subsumed to be a 
servant of the system, not its master or raison d’etre. 
 
Tribunal premises – in civil service speak ‘The Estate’ – are an administrative 
resource. They have an important role to play in the machinery of justice. They are 
part of the iconography of justice. Shoddy buildings, rushed staff and judges 
wandering along the corridor to collect their next case, because there is no one else 
to do it for them, reflect poorly on the justice system and in my experience 
engender resentment on the part of users, often resulting in further appeals. This 
has costs consequences which could be offset by proper maintenance of ‘The 
Estate’.  
 
Public confidence in the tribunal system is, I suggest, necessary to avoid a 
corrosive and jaundiced attitude, prejudicial to a healthy society, and, as Genn 
says, ‘If corrosion of public confidence is a genuine threat…it would assist in 
shoring up those areas of activity that would best halt decline in confidence or 
promote renewed confidence.’(Genn 2010: 178). 
 
So, resource constraints may save money in the short term but they have real if not 
immediately apparent or quantifiable consequences for users.  
 
Judges are themselves resources. As in any other profession time and the pressure 
of work take their toll. There is also a danger of case weariness and cynicism. 
These things arise from the judicial battery having a low charge, just enough to run 
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the judge machine but not at optimum level. Holidays provide a quick but 
unsustained charge. In the current climate sabbaticals would not find favour but 
thinking the unthinkable might result in better motivated judges, increased and 
better quality output and longer judicial service before retirement, thus reducing 
the call on the judicial pension fund. In America sabbaticals can be taken by senior 
judges. They might prove beneficial here. 
 
The Administrative Appeals Chamber is a collective judicial resource. The 
workload is ever increasing. There seems a tendency on the part of the Government 
to assign new rights of appeal to this Chamber so long as they appear to fit, albeit 
loosely, in this jurisdiction. That is fine but the corollary is that the Chamber needs 
proper resourcing, and in turn that is dependent upon work forecasting.  
 
Forecasting the size and type of workload increase is an inexact science, dependent 
to some extent on Departmental predictions. In the past these have invariably 
proved largely inaccurate. A better and more reliable system of forecasting needs 
to be thought about, and the appointments system improved.  
 
Third, better relations between judiciary and administration. 
 
Although judges and administrators are said to work in partnership their aims are 
different. Most partnerships are directed to a common aim, but the working lives of 
civil servants are ruled by statistics, performance targets and budgets. Not so with 
judges. Common goals are more in the form of conceptual mission statements 
about the delivery of justice, as opposed to mechanisms for its attainment. 
 
Judges and their administrators need to recognize that each has a very different job 
to do and that there is in reality little interface between them. Being under no 
delusions about this might help to dispel any resentment arising from the fact that it 
is the administrators who hold the departmental purse strings, and who will, even 
in the same department as the judges, not be receptive to judicial suggestions 
unless and until they can be quantified in cost benefit terms, and a business case 
shown. The corollary is that complaints by judges, about for example sharing 
clerks, poor premises and administrative errors, are invariably met with a blanket 
justification of budgetary resources, irrespective of the reality of the situation. 
 
  
 66 
The tensions arising between judges and administrators are real, and perhaps 
replicate those in other areas in which there is an interface between the professional 
function and the administration in the organization in which that function is 
delivered, such as the NHS. Judges often bear the consequences of actions by 
administrators but there is no correlation between effect and responsibility, since 
judges have no real power over administrators.  With continued austerity measures 
these problems are set to continue and probably worsen. What is needed is an 
awareness of and recognition by administrators that it is judges, not they, who are 
at the sharp end of the justice system and so due heed must be paid to the views of 
judges, even though their concerns cannot always be justified in simple accounting 
terms. 
 
Fourth, more robust judgments. 
 
No judgment can be perfect. It will always be susceptible to some form of 
criticism, whether justified or not. I agree with Lord Neuberger that ‘many of us 
judges should be more self confident, more ruthless, when we write our 
judgments.’(Neuberger 2013). That is particularly apposite in judgments of the 
Upper Tribunal, since they are binding on lower tribunals, decision makers and 
representatives when points of law are in issue. The longer a judgment the greater 
likelihood that the central issue, and the crux of what is decided and why, will be 
obscured and it may also be that the distinction between core reasoning and by the 
way comment62 is blurred. 
 
Today, in my view, there are too many judgments 63. If the law is unclear an 
authoritative judgment is needed for clarification. Too often, however, judgments 
appear to conflict with each other and result in further judgments at higher judicial 
level. The result is, as Cover puts it, that sometimes the problem that requires a 
court or tribunal to make an authoritative ruling is not that the law is unclear but 
that there is too much law, so that courts (especially appellate courts) exist to 
‘suppress law, to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon law a 
hierarchy.’(Cover 1983: foreword). 
                                                         
62 In legal terminology ratio decidendi and obiter dicta, respectively 
63 Interestingly, I wrote this before publication of an article in The Times legal section, 23 October 
2013: ‘Teamwork in the Supreme Court is bringing the clarity of more single judgments…partly 
the dramatic rise in single judgments is down to the ever rising workload of the court, partly it is 
due to a desire to offer greater guidance to hard pressed judges in the lower courts.’    
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That there are too many, and too long judgments, is a direct function of the 
proliferation of badly drafted law.  
 
Fifth, rational and courteous political debate. 
 
I have commented on the trend to demonization of benefit claimants, of problems 
of access to justice and the societal impact of this. Better quality political debate, 
calm reflection and measured legislative change, as appropriate, would benefit all 
in society. 
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CHAPTER  8 
 
 
‘Have you thought about becoming a Judge  ?’ 
 
 
So reads a leaflet now appearing in courts and tribunals. As part of the new process 
of transparency and diversity people are for the first time encouraged to think about 
becoming judges. Arguably, there are now more incentives than ever to do so. 
Private practice is under threat as never before. Set against that a judicial life has 
its attractions: a fixed salary, a pensions scheme, a more settled way of life, 
freedom from partners’ fee income chivvying and status. Added to that are factors 
such as public service, a chance to make a difference and so on. 
 
In ‘Becoming a Judge’64 the Law Society lists, as the reasons people seek to join 
the judiciary, as including the chance to make decisions that affect people’s lives, a 
desire to contribute to public service, the opportunity to add value to a firm or 
employer, a new personal and professional challenge, a wish to gain new legal 
skills, and personal pride and social standing. From a survey in August 2013 the 
Judicial Appointments Commission learned that 97% of applicants were motivated 
because they thought the work interesting, 93% wanted to make a difference to the 
law and 89% felt a sense of public service.  
 
Experience has taught me that those aspiring to the judiciary, whether on a fee paid 
or salaried basis, need to have certain qualities, and be aware of some things which 
will not be revealed by official sources.                                                         
64 Law Society, 2010 
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A judge clearly must be a competent lawyer, though not necessarily have prior 
experience in the relevant jurisdiction, as training will be given. A colleague once 
said that of all in court the judge is the one who needs to know the least about the 
law, since that will be explained to the judge and argued about by the advocates. 
That is no longer the case, especially in an inquisitorial system, and especially with 
the increase in litigants in person. 
 The Judicial Executive Board reports65 that the sharp rise in litigants in person is 
putting  significant pressure on civil courts and tribunals, creating delays, security 
problems and forcing a change in the ways judges work. As the Times legal 
correspondent says, this means that ‘Judges will increasingly hold the ring, doing 
the work of lawyers,’(Gibb 2014) a markedly different role from judges in the past. 
These problems are likely to worsen, given that the Justice Minister66 tells the 
Times that he wants lawyers out of the process as much as possible Although his 
comments were made by reference to mediation some may think that they indicate 
a wider view of lawyers in the justice system. DIY justice seems set to become the 
norm, meaning more and more difficult work for judges. 
 
A judge must know when to bring proceedings back on track. It is no good just 
sitting back and letting the parties and their advocates (if any) battle it out. So, as a 
judge you must have the ability to direct and retain control, but not in an 
authoritarian way, with the risk of alienating the representatives and erecting a 
barrier to justice, not to mention a potential appeal. The trick is to do this as 
pleasantly and politely as possible – a smile as appropriate, a ‘will you forgive me 
Mr X if I ask you to move on…’, putting your pen down as an indicator that what 
is being said has no relevance, stopping repetitive questions by ‘Thank you Mr X, I 
see the point you are making’ and above all unfailing courtesy and patience, even 
in the face of an impossible witness or an awkward advocate. Techniques like these 
will get the parties eating out of your hand, and make your life easier. 
 
Obviously judges must lack bias and have good listening skills. That does not 
mean no prior knowledge or views on the case. An open mind does not mean an 
empty one. Preparation is worth its weight in gold. It saves time, enabling a judge 
to home in on the issues, demonstrates to the parties and representatives that the 
                                                        
65 Report, May 2014 
66 Simon Hughes MP 
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judge has a grasp of the case and thereby fosters the view that he is interested in 
and engages with the case. 
 
Aspiring judges need to be aware that they will live in a legislative framework of 
continual change. This can be stimulating and avoids the tedium inherent in 
stagnation but it comes at a cost – that of continual training, discarding former 
legislative regimes and the comfort of the familiar and the challenge of the new 
and untested. New judges need the resilience to withstand this and the increasing 
volumes of work and fewer resources. Austerity measures will continue for years 
to come and will effectively increase pressure on judges in terms of workload and 
administrative back up. 
 
In addition to resilience a new judge will need a thick skin, as an insulation against 
attacks by politicians and actual or perceived criticism from higher judicial 
authorities. Politicians not infrequently nowadays attack judgments (especially in 
human rights) but judges have no right of reply. That must be accepted with the 
territory. Also, no judgment is appeal proof, nor should judges seek to make it so. 
It is inherent in judicial work that one’s decisions will sometimes be overturned on 
appeal.  
 
Sometimes it needs a real effort not to take this as a reflection on one’s abilities. I 
have both been overturned and have been the overturner, so to speak. I know full 
well how it feels. New judges need to regard being overturned as a positive 
learning experience, not a negative criticism. Remember that the higher judicial 
authorities themselves are vulnerable to onward appeals. (In Appendix M the 
House of Lords Judicial Committee, as it then was, said that the Court of Appeal 
had got it wrong). This goes hand in hand with obscure legislation, a fertile area for 
appeals.   
 
New judges may like to remember the salutary comments of the Supreme Court 
about a Court of Appeal case67: ‘The problem lies in the drafting of the relevant 
provisions, which defies conventional analysis. It is not only obscure in places and 
lacking in detail, but contains pointers in both directions.’ Take comfort, then, 
from the fact that, on the same legislative provisions, three experienced Court of 
Appeal judges reached three different conclusions.                                                         
67 AS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 1076 
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Given that no judgment can be a model of perfection new judges should be ready 
to take risks, recognizing that no judge at any level can in every case say with 
absolute certainty what the result should be. Knowing what will be acceptable in 
risk taking will come with experience. 
 
For example, a new, timorous judge may be loath to depart from the stricture of 
procedural requirements in, say, the order of written submissions. Generally, 
though, that which is done can always be undone and if a party raises a valid 
objection rulings and even judgments can be set aside without the need for a formal 
appeal.  
 
Similarly, although unfailing courtesy is essential that does not mean that a new 
judge should fear expressing robust views where appropriate. Balanced against that 
is the need not to develop ‘judgitis’, not very common nowadays but seen in the 
past when some judges used language of a bygone age and body or verbal language 
which conflated their judicial position with that of a higher entity. Humility is the 
key in this, and maybe an inscription facing the judge, like that of the apocryphal 
‘shut up you fool’ would be useful. 
 
In order to survive, or hopefully thrive, as a judge all these things need to be borne 
in mind. They are not esoteric or conceptually intellectual but they have been tried 
and tested by my experience and they work, at least to some degree.  
 
Without being cynical or defeatist aspiring judges should realize that they cannot 
please everyone and may indeed please neither of the parties in a case. Not all 
wrongs can be resolved by the law, since disputes involve human beings whose 
feelings can be put at risk in the context of a dispute. That may be also true of the 
judge, whose own views cannot be superimposed (at least not consciously) on the 
law. 
 
Realise too that despite any deficiencies in the law or ‘the system’ order and the 
Rule of Law is better than disorder and anarchy. Nothing designed or implemented 
by humans attains perfection. All states and systems of governance (including that 
aspect of governance represented by the law and the justice system) are flawed. 
The rational and ethical response to that is the need for the judgment and wisdom 
of people in making any system function in an orderly way. Despite current trends 
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for decision making by computers (for example in benefit claims dependent upon 
points scoring) judgment and wisdom are different from quantitative analysis and 
the mere application of a process to a situation. A computer lacks understanding. 
Although judges cannot alter the raw material with which they work - the law – 
they can apply it in a way no machine could, by understanding its concepts and 
aims and applying them by well established principles. We are still, in the law at 
any rate, many years away from the ‘intelligent machine’ written about by Alan 
Turing in 1947.  
 
Do not look for the perfect or  ‘right’ answer. There isn’t one. Judges can do no 
more than harness and manage their intelligence and capabilities so as to provide 
the best answer possible in the circumstances of the case.’ (Thomas 2010: 184).  
 
Aim for clarity and brevity. Self evident, but not always just for the reasons one 
might think. An additional reason is not making yourself – or your fellow judges – 
a hostage to fortune. Focused, relevant and material judgments make it harder for 
parties (especially litigants in person) to cite selective and unrepresentative extracts 
in other cases. In the digital age there is a plethora of on – line authorities and 
litigants in person lack the skills or, indeed, duty to the tribunal owed by lawyers, 
to sort the wheat from the chaff.  
 
Be stoical. No judge can escape comment or criticism. Criticism comes with the 
turf. So should stoicism.68 I know this full well. As an Upper Tribunal judge I often 
overturned decisions of other judges. Now, as a first tier immigration judge I in 
turn am sometimes overturned by the Upper Tribunal, a salutary reminder of the 
judicial facts of life.  
 
Realize that your own expectations of yourself and those of others will change and 
be moulded by the judicial organization of which you are part. As Thomas says 
‘Judges become a member of an institution with a role to play and that role 
attracts a broad perception which subverts the idiosyncratic to the 
institution.’(Thomas 2010: 246). 
 
 As John Donne said, no man is an island, entire unto himself, neither is any judge. 
Irrespective of the background of the judge he or she will consciously or                                                         
68 ‘In the present era the spotlight on the judiciary is more acute than ever before.’ McCloskey J, 
Nwaighe [2014]UKUT 00418 (IAT) 
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unconsciously adjust and respond to the expectations of a raft, so that a greater or 
lesser measure of conformity is inevitable. 
 
Judicial life does not suit all lawyers. Some may miss the camaraderie and rivalry 
of a practising lawyer, some may find judicial life isolated and exposed and some 
may miss trying to persuade others of the merits of the case. I have, though, never 
come across a judge who has resigned because he did not like judging. I have, 
similarly, come across many lawyers who would jump at the chance of a judicial 
appointment. All I can say is that if I were able to write my own job description I 
could hardly do better than write that of a judge. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
When I began this work I had no clear road map of where I wanted to go or the 
final destination. As the work progressed my thinking developed, partly as a result 
of reading the views of other commentators, which resonated with mine. In doing 
so I guarded against ‘data mining’, the sifting of evidence until it supports a desired 
outcome. 
 
There is a medical analogy: a patient may have disparate symptoms, of no 
significance to him, but a doctor may connect all in arriving at a diagnosis and, in 
particular, treatment. The ‘diagnosis’ here is the identification of current judicial 
problems, the ‘treatment’ being how to solve or at least mitigate their effect. 
 
The learning outcome for me has been, in part, that resilience in the face of rapidly 
changing and hastily thought out legislation comes from a realisation that such 
challenges offer an opportunity to develop the law, with the job satisfaction that 
brings. Additionally, I have come to appreciate the collegiate atmosphere of my 
jurisdiction in which, unlike most judges in the ‘uniformed’ branch, almost all of 
us worked in the same building. That offers the benefits of a collective, in which 
thoughts – and complaints – may readily be interchanged. At the very least that 
provides a release mechanism from tedium, irritation and frustration, for example.  
 
Decisions of the upper tribunal have the force of precedent. Not all involve new 
points of law but in those in which a precedential decision is called for I have 
learned to be selective, and focused. Unless the case in question raises fairly and 
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squarely the issue needing to be decided any views expressed on that point will not 
be crucial to the reasoning. Different views of different judges on any such issue, 
but not essential to the individual case, mean that once a clear cut case has to be 
decided there is a fog of peripheral views in other cases, and this tends to obscure 
the essential issue and leads to longer, more complex, decisions, as those other 
views have to be taken into account. I have, then, learned to resist beachcombing 
for a new point. 
 
Austerity measures often translate into significant time pressure, an aspect of 
resource allocation. I have come to appreciate the value of lateral judicial thinking, 
the ‘smarter’ if not ‘harder’ working techniques of active case management, 
facilitating a collaborative approach to decision making. In this another medical 
analogy arises: a doctor will deal with diagnosis, prognosis and treatment but the 
patient also has an essential role to play, by co-operating in the treatment regime, 
and others (nurses, medical administrators and so on) also have their part to play.  
 
The overview I have taken brings the uncomfortable awareness that the ever 
prescriptive nature of welfare law (like immigration and asylum law) means that 
judges are more than ever inescapably involved in the implementation of policy, 
reflected in prescriptive law. The result is less room for the traditional judicial 
function. 
 
Prescription does not unavoidably remove any ‘reasonableness’ concept or 
application but it does significantly reduce its ambit. Room to manoeuvre, 
however, still lies in the discretion arising in, for example, adjournments, time 
limits in case management, compliance with directions and so on. All these involve 
consideration of ‘the interests of justice’, another way, I suggest, of expressing 
reasonableness. My internal code of reasonableness has been framed by my 
education, upbringing and the people I came into contact with in private practice 
and as appellants. It is informed by the fact that my jurisdiction involves ‘people 
law’, the law that applies to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged in our society. 
As such it must be transparent, accessible and clear, and in my view humane in its 
application. I see this area of law as an aspect of a civilized society, part of the 
normative structure of our society.  
 
In so far as I am able to be ‘reasonable’ there are no controlling master theories or 
standards against which reasonableness may be tested. It is so case dependent. Like 
  
 76 
the elephant test, we may find it difficult accurately to describe but we all know it 
when we see it. That is tempered by the fact that what may seem eminently 
reasonable to a Guardian reader may seem manifestly unreasonable to a Daily Mail 
reader. Moreover, although I have to give reasons for any judgment those reasons 
do not have to be reasonable, save that they must address the issues, law and 
evidence.  
 
In other words a ‘reasonable’ judgment does not depend on one’s view of the 
merits or moral value of the law to be applied. Interestingly, one definition of 
‘reasonable’ is ‘having sound judgment’. (Oxford 2001). In the same vein, if 
justice is found in ‘the disposition to fairness, to give each their due’ (Salum 2003: 
196) I have administered ‘justice’ in ensuring that each receives their ‘due’, in the 
sense of legal entitlement. It may be that ‘reasonable’ in this sense equates with 
rationality, in that my decisions are supported by known judicial techniques, 
precedent, interpretation and so on, and thereby are ‘justified’ to the parties. 
Reasonableness may also lie not so much in what is done but in the manner in 
which it is done, if ‘a disposition to fairness is constituted in part by having the 
right sort of emotional equipment for sympathy, an appropriate, even handed 
concern for the interests of others.’ (Salum 2003: 196). Perhaps in this sense only 
my judgments have been ‘reasonable’ given the lack of further appeals from me. I 
recognize, however, that this may be due to ‘appeal fatigue’ on the part of an 
appellant, who might find the prospect of the Court of Appeal daunting. It might 
also suggest a conservative approach in my judgments but, that said, one of the 
benefits of working in the Upper Tribunal is the absence of a daily case list to 
clear. Within reason, then, I could take time to make what I considered to be the 
‘right’ (perhaps ‘correct’ would be a better word) decision.  
 
Once a decision has been ‘put to bed’ it becomes history but even so I cannot ever 
recall agonizing that I had made the ‘wrong’ decision and even when I was 
reversed by the Court of Appeal that decision turned on interpretation of an arcane 
point of law, not whether I had acted ‘unreasonably’. I have come to recognize that 
there may be an element of self protection in this, since judges’…feel a 
psychological compulsion to think they are making the right decision…No one 
likes to be tormented, so judges do not look back and worry about how many of 
their thousands [of judgments] may have been mistaken. As the years pass they 
become increasingly confident because they have behind them an ever – longer 
train of decisions that they doubt not are sound.’ (Posner 2010:289).  
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What Posner calls legalism is an apt description of prescriptive law, with the result 
that I cannot in many cases have resort to ‘nonlegalist’ factors such as what is ‘just’ 
or ‘fair’. (Posner 2010: 77). Indeed, ‘No law can be unjust’ (Hobbes 1996: 230) for 
what is just is determined by positive law. So, then, my own views on the law I 
apply have no relevance: in the same way that it serves no purpose if a doctor rails 
against a particularly awful medical condition – he just has to treat it – I just have 
to apply the law before me in the particular case. As Tamanaha asserts‘…the rule 
of law is compatible with, and may be instituted by, a system that contains the most 
immoral of laws’ (Tamanaha 2001: 98). 
 
The ‘boundaries, barriers and benefits’ remain. The boundaries are ever more 
shrinking, circumscribing by extensively prescriptive law what many would regard 
as the full and proper ambit of the judicial function, and thereby drawing judges 
into the policy implementation collective. The barriers are particularly to the fore, 
given the continuing focus on austerity measures and all that this implies. The 
measures I have indicated go some way to addressing consequential problems, but 
those measures are in the form of symptomatic, not curative, treatment. The 
benefits system, and individuals within it, is often in the eye of the public and the 
government and the ability by the citizen to challenge authority, by use of the 
appellate system, is a valuable part of democracy in action. Arguably the 
government now more than ever before involves itself in many aspects of ordinary 
life, so that the benefits of an independent, motivated and properly resourced 
judiciary continue undiminished, even enhanced, as the hallmark of the rule of law, 
itself a source of protection for you – and for me. 
 
As a part time judge I will continue to utilize judgecraft techniques I have learned 
and developed over the years, and will continue to be an ardent disciple of active 
case management and the collaborative approach. In a sense the narrative I have 
provided illustrates how and why I have come to adapt to contemporary issues in 
judging and in that sense, then, it is a theory of practice. I am fortified in a key part 
of this theory - the case management/collaborative approach - by the fact that this 
is strongly advocated in a recent JUSTICE report (JUSTICE 2015) and, as an 
authoritative commentator says ‘The path ahead is clear…it requires more 
proactive case management by judges to identify what is in dispute and what is the 
best way of proceeding quickly and efficiently to a conclusion…’ (Pannick 2015). 
 
  
 78 
My theory of and practice of judgecraft has been based on the traditional judicial 
virtues of independence, lack of partiality, open mindedness, integrity and the like 
and I have been trained in effective communication techniques, how to assimilate 
and deal with rapidly changing law, how to work with others and, for example, 
issues to do with race and discrimination. All this equips me to deal with what 
Tamanaha calls ‘law in the books’ but what of ‘the gap between the written law 
and the practices of lawyers and judges’? (Tamanaha 2001).  ‘The difficulties 
of…interpretation arise when the legislature has no meaning at all; when the 
question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it’ (Gray 1909: 165.) 
Modern legislatures are very different from those Gray had in mind in 1909. They 
leave little room for the exercise of what Hart calls ‘interstitial powers’ (Hart  
1994: 273).The ‘gap’  spoken of by Tamanaha, and inherent in the words of Gray, 
is in reality very narrow in welfare law. That is because the legislation increasingly 
aims to address every contingency, so that ‘unresolvable gaps’ (Thomas 2005: 326) 
are few and far between. Such gaps cannot be filled on a hunch, the sort of thing 
that arises from the ‘God Syndrome…which settles on some judges shortly after 
their appointment to the Bench’ (Thomas 2005: 326). My antidote to that is 
continually to be aware that being a judge is a unique privilege, and to be reminded 
every day of the problems of the most vulnerable in our society. That fosters 
humility.  
 
Also, decisions of the upper tribunal are in effect working tools for use not only by 
the parties to an appeal but by other stakeholders – departmental decision makers, 
representatives and so on. As such, and remembering that ‘the rules by which the 
citizen is to be bound should be ascertainable by him’ (Diplock 1981: 279), my aim 
has been to make decisions as short and clear as reasonably possible. Long 
decisions which are little more than a discourse on the area of law involved make 
for difficult reading and application, as their salient point(s) may be elusive, they 
lend themselves to unrepresentative selective citation in other cases and ‘length, 
prolixity and elaboration [lead] to inaccessibility’ (Bingham 2011: 43).  The 
‘ability to understand the interests and passion of those who appear before [me]’ 
(Salum 2003: 186) forms part of the backdrop to my work, illuminated by the fact 
that this is law for people in the real world, affecting real lives. 
 
When full retirement beckons I hope to give something back, perhaps in training or 
writing for a wider audience. That is a challenge yet to be met. 
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APPENDIX 
   
This appendix includes  a range of decisions, indicative of the work I have done in 
the Upper Tribunal and redacted where appropriate to preserve anonymity.  
Below is a brief commentary on the issue in each case. 
   
A 
Case management directions, saving time by requiring the respondent to say what 
they made of the merits of an application for permission to appeal. 
 
B 
The submission which followed from A. The end to end decision making process 
was shortened as the detailed submission on the merits, from the 
respondent,  formed the basis of my decision in the appeal. 
 
C 
A determination of an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. 
Time spent on a fairly detailed determination meant that the parties would then be 
able to focus on the issues and would be better able to engage in the appellate 
process than they would have been by a simple, quick but uncritical “permission to 
appeal is granted.” 
 
D 
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An example of a determination of an unsuccessful application for permission. 
These required equally, if not more, detailed reasons as successful applications, so 
that parties would not be left in the dark about why their application had failed. 
Inadequate shorter reasons, although perhaps quicker, may have led to judicial 
review or complaint, requiring more time and costs to deal with. 
  
E 
A decision setting aside a decision of the lower tribunal, where both parties agreed 
the tribunal’s decision was erroneous in law. Quick and easy but having the 
disadvantage of lacking substance. 
   
F 
This is the sort of decision on appeal which follows the kind of case management 
directions referred to above. Such directions put the appeal on the right track and 
the parties are free to agree or disagree with the issues identified in the permission. 
Usually they agree and, if they do, the subsequent decision just needs to 
encapsulate what was said earlier at the permission stage, with, as appropriate, any 
useful comment by either of the parties. A particularly useful case management 
technique when time is scarce, because of pressure of work. 
  
G 
An unusual case. Not an appeal as such, but a matter referred up to the 
commissioner by the Secretary of State for determination. Welfare law is so 
heavily circumscribed that empathy, humanity and compassion can rarely play a 
part. In this case, however, the law was much more fluid, and so I felt I was able to 
act in a humane - but still legally permissible -way because of the degree of 
discretion allowed by the law. In consequence I found this a refreshing change. 
  
H 
An example of a case showing some of the problems encountered by foreign 
widows, claiming widow’s benefit. Such appeals are common and pose particular 
evidential difficulties, since the claimant is never able to give direct evidence to the 
tribunal. This shows the importance of the active and objective participation in the 
appeal by the respondent, the Secretary of State. Without that I may have missed 
salient points, the appeal would have taken longer and possibly with a very 
different result. Pressure of resources may mean that such participation will be 
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lacking in future, to the detriment of justice. 
  
I 
The rate of income support paid to couples was less than that for two individuals. 
This often raised issues about whether people were “living together as a married or 
unmarried couple.” If benefit was wrongly paid there was usually an overpayment 
decision. In this appeal also there were human rights issues raised and arguments 
about the legality of evidence given under caution at interview. These 
complications illustrate the breadth and depth of issues often involved, so much so 
that such a case is of greater complexity than the run of the mill Crown or County 
Court case, a factor disappointingly not recognized by those who disparage tribunal 
work.  
 
J 
An industrial injuries case, involving consideration of whether the claimant still 
had any disability attributable to the relevant accident. There was no dispute that 
the claimant had medical problems, but I was required to separate my feelings as a 
human being from the rigid requirements of the law. That did not cause me any 
anxiety or conflict, since it is perfectly permissible for the law to regulate claims in 
this way, and in any event the claim was to industrial injuries benefit. Clearly, the 
nexus had to be present. 
  
K 
This appeal involved incapacity benefit, now replaced by employment and support 
allowance, which is more extensively set out in the complex legislation. This 
appeal shows some of the problems involved in even a relatively straightforward 
predecessor of the current benefit. The decision also says something about the 
standards of decision making expected of tribunals. I have no record of how long I 
spent on this (or any other) appeal, but I estimate I would have taken several hours, 
in reading the papers, considering the law and simply deliberating. The lower 
tribunal would have had about 30 minutes to determine the appeal. The disparity is 
striking, and may indicate that if lower tribunals were allowed more time better 
quality decisions would result. I recognize that the corollary may be that different 
time constraints in the Upper Tribunal may result in an excessively picky poring 
over of the decision under appeal. 
  
L 
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In some categories the Upper Tribunal has the same judicial review jurisdiction as 
the High Court. This case is a judicial review decision, which followed detailed 
reasons given for permission to apply for judicial review. It revolves around an 
issue of procedural fairness. 
  
M 
An example of problems sometimes faced by asylum seekers who claim income 
support. This case shows that even the Court of Appeal does not always get the 
“right” answer, since the interpretation of the relevant phrase adopted by the Court 
of Appeal was shown to be wrong, by the House of Lords. I was able to give a 
substantive decision on the merits of the original application, instead of sending the 
case back for rehearing before the lower tribunal. 
  
N 
An example of an appeal in which seemingly innocuous words (“provided by”) can 
give rise to problems of interpretation and application. A difficult case, with both 
parties represented by experienced advocates. This case illustrates some of the 
sources that may be used as an aid to interpretation. It also serves to illustrate the 
problems caused by seemingly innocuous legislation, which could have been 
avoided if the legislation were clearer. Also, this case was difficult enough even 
with the aid of skilled counsel. Without proper, or any, representation 
determination of the appeal would have taken much longer and without the crucial 
benefit of my hearing all that could reasonably be said on behalf of the parties. In 
such cases the gap between what might be revealed by the inquisitorial approach 
and proper representation is often so wide that it materially affects the appeal. 
  
O 
A disability living allowance claim. This shows that interpretations used in earlier, 
replaced, legislation can still be valid. It shows the complexity of the law in 
question and how this causes difficulties in interpretation and application. 
Although I held the decision of the tribunal to be in error of law I was not able to 
give my own decision on the underlying appeal as matters arose which were best 
dealt with by a fresh tribunal, to whom I gave directions. 
  
P 
An appeal involving a claim to jobseeker’s allowance. A complex case, requiring 
consideration of the substantive domestic law, human rights law and European 
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Union law, discrimination issues and in which both sides were represented by 
counsel well versed in the field. It was conceded that the lower tribunal’s decision 
had to be set aside but this was not a case in which it was appropriate to remit for 
rehearing below, because matters of legal interpretation and application were in 
issue and the lower tribunal would have been no better placed than I to address 
these. The points it illustrates are the same as those in A12. 
  
Q 
An appeal relating to a question of benefit entitlement and recovery. The amount 
involved was relatively small but the decision illustrates the complexities of the 
legislation, which applies irrespective of the amounts involved. 
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